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REPORTING AGENCY PERFORMANCE: BEHIND
THE SEC’S ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS
Urska Velikonja*
Every October, after the end of its fiscal year, the Securities
and Exchange Commission releases its annual enforcement
report, detailing its activity for the year.  The report boasts
record enforcement activity, often showing significant in-
creases over the prior fiscal year in the number of enforcement
actions brought and monetary penalties ordered.  The num-
bers suggest that the SEC is ever tougher on securities viola-
tors.  The SEC includes these statistics in its budget requests;
the figures are repeated in congressional testimony, scholar-
ship, policy proposals, and the business press.
Yet the SEC’s metrics are deeply flawed.  This Article, a
pilot study, reviews fifteen years of enforcement actions and
demonstrates that the widely-circulated statistics are invalid
because they do not measure what they purport to measure,
and unreliable because they are inconsistent and can be
manipulated all too easily.  The SEC double and triple counts
many of the enforcement actions it brings and overstates the
fines it orders.  Once these measures are adjusted, they reveal
that enforcement remained steady between 2002 and 2014,
and shifted towards easier-to-prosecute strict-liability
violations.
The SEC is not alone in using statistics that have a pro-
pensity to mislead to report its output.  Multiple reporting stat-
utes authorize Congress to cut agencies’ budgets for failing to
meet performance targets.  In response, agencies report
flawed statistics to protect their ability to continue enforcing
the law.  This Article suggests that Congress should not
threaten to reduce an agency’s budget because of year-to-year
fluctuations in enforcement.  In addition, to make reported
numbers more reliable, nonfinancial performance measures
should not be developed by the agency.  Instead, the selection
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and development of performance indicators should be out-
sourced and possibly standardized across agencies, much
like financial reporting has already been standardized.  Doing
so would depoliticize reporting, as well as facilitate compari-
sons among agencies, both domestically and internationally.
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INTRODUCTION
The year 2014 was a “bumper year” for financial enforce-
ment agencies;1 the Department of Justice (DOJ),2 the Com-
1 Madison Marriage, 2014 Was a Bumper Year for Regulators, FIN. TIMES
(May 10, 2015, 6:48 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/be5231bc-f59d-11e4-
bc6d-00144feab7de.html#axzz3al0FRVD9 [http://perma.cc/RZL4-EQUW].
2 See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Recovers Nearly $6 Billion from
False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2014 (Nov. 20, 2014), http://
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modity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC),3 and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) all
reported record numbers in enforcement.  Specifically, the SEC
reported that it brought 755 enforcement actions and secured
$4.16 billion in monetary penalties in the fiscal year 2014,4
setting all-time records for the SEC and posting significant
increases over the prior fiscal years.5  Various news outlets
have reported prominently both figures as evidence of a more
“‘severe’ stance towards wrongdoing in the market.”6  The SEC
itself celebrated 2014 as a “very strong year for enforcement,”
highlighting the aggregate numbers of enforcement actions
filed and monetary penalties ordered.7
But, was it?  Through a close study of SEC enforcement
over a fifteen-year period this Article reveals that the statistics
the SEC most commonly uses to assess and report its enforce-
ment performance are flawed.8  The term “enforcement action”
includes all legal proceedings that the SEC brings, including
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-nearly-6-billion-false-
claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2014 [http://perma.cc/8PJS-2D5C] (reporting that
the year set a “record” due to “unprecedented $3.1 billion from banks and other
financial institutions” for mortgage fraud).
3 See U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, FY 2014 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE
REPORT, FY 2016 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN 86 (2015), http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/
groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/2014apr.pdf [http://perma.cc/
FK4H-E67V] (reporting that “[t]he CFTC obtained a record $3.27 billion in mone-
tary sanctions” in fiscal 2014).
4 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2014,
at 19 (2014), http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secafr2014.pdf [https://
perma.cc/JTM5-WGDJ].  The SEC’s fiscal year starts on October first of the ear-
lier calendar year and ends on September thirtieth of that calendar year.  The
2014 fiscal year runs from October 1, 2013, to September 30, 2014.
5 Id. at 2.
6 Marriage, supra note 1; see also Jean Eaglesham & Michael Rapoport, SEC R
Gets Busy With Accounting Investigations, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 20, 2015, 6:51 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-gets-busy-with-accounting-investigations-
1421797895 [http://perma.cc/V26P-FMD5] (describing the SEC’s “push to step
up its policing of accounting fraud”); Aruna Viswanatha, SEC Shifts Focus to
Ratings Firms, Fund Valuations as Crisis-Era Cases Fade, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 18,
2015, 4:34 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/03/18/sec-shifts-focus
-to-ratings-firms-fund-valuations-as-crisis-era-cases-fade/ [http://perma.cc/
ND5Z-KNF7] (noting that the SEC’s broken window policing has led to “a record
755 cases from the SEC” in FY 2014).
7 SEC’s FY 2014 Enforcement Actions Span Securities Industry and Include
First-Ever Cases, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.
sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370543184660 [http://per
ma.cc/XM85-C7HU].
8 See Jonathan R. Macey, The Distorting Incentives Facing the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 639 (2010) (“[T]he
SEC’s performance is measured by Congress and in the court of public opinion on
the simplistic basis of how many cases it brings and on the size of the fines it
collects.”).
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primary enforcement actions, as well as suspensions, bars,
and license revocations that are usually the second or third
proceedings against the same defendant for the same miscon-
duct.  In fact, during the study period, the share of second and
third proceedings increased from 23% to 34% of all SEC en-
forcement actions filed.9  Once the SEC’s measures are ad-
justed,10 they show that core SEC enforcement did not increase
between 2002 and 2014—contrary to what reported statistics
suggest.  The statistic “monetary penalties ordered” also  over-
states the actual figure: it includes disgorgement orders offset
by restitution ordered in a parallel criminal prosecution, civil
fines imposed by and paid to FINRA or the exchanges, and
penalties ordered but waived due to defendant’s financial in-
ability to pay.11
These are only two examples of the Commission’s problem-
atic reporting.  As this Article demonstrates in more detail, the
two other enforcement statistics that the SEC highlights, de-
fendant count and subject-matter categorization, are also dis-
torted.12  In addition to overstating its enforcement effort, the
SEC’s reported statistics suggest the presence of bogus trends
and obscure actual trends; they reveal nonproblems and dis-
guise real problems.13  Reported statistics conceal whether and
where SEC enforcement might be lacking, and encourage the
agency to bring easy-to-prosecute strict-liability offenses in-
stead of pursuing more serious violations.14
The SEC is not the only agency that reports flawed enforce-
ment statistics.  Other agencies also report figures that are
neither useful nor do they accurately reflect the agencies’ true
activities.  The Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) re-
porting suffers from “[w]idespread and persistent data inaccu-
racy.”15  The Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) annual reports
have become less useful in recent years.16  The enforcement
9 See infra section III.A.1.  The distortion in the defendant count is smaller
though still large: between 9% (in 2008) and 23% (in 2003) of defendants have
already been counted once in the SEC’s statistics. See id.
10 See infra Part V.
11 See infra section IV.A.
12 See infra sections III.A.3, B.2.
13 See infra sections IV.A–D.
14 See infra sections IV.E, F.
15 David L. Markell & Robert L. Glicksman, A Holistic Look at Agency Enforce-
ment, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1, 47 (2014).
16 Annual reports until 2013 reported the FTC’s success rates in enforcement
actions.  Subsequent reports omit that measure, but report “consumer savings
compared to the amount of FTC resources allocated to consumer protection law
enforcement.”  U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2014 PERFORMANCE REPORT AND
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statistics they do report are internally inconsistent17 and con-
fusing.18  Despite a considerable effort to add bite to its en-
forcement, the CFTC reports very little.  The metrics that it
does report do not measure what they purport to measure.19
Even if they did, they would be pretty useless because they are
so limited.  If anything, the SEC’s reporting on enforcement is
more transparent than reporting by other agencies, making the
analysis offered in this Article possible.
Fuzzy reporting is problematic.  In part, the reporting chal-
lenges that this Article identifies may be insurmountable be-
cause reported figures, in particular enforcement statistics, are
used for a variety of conflicting purposes.  Statistics used to
measure how the agency communicates its priorities should be
different from statistics used to measure how agency priorities
are put into action, which, in turn, should be different from
statistics that are used to evaluate the deterrent effects of vari-
ous enforcement initiatives.  Yet the same numbers are used to
do it all.20
But in part, fuzzy reporting can be improved.  That report-
ing issues have not been resolved is a problem at several differ-
ent levels.  First, federal agencies are particularly well situated
to collect and organize vast amounts of data by virtue of being
regulators and enforcers of important statutes.  Reporting data
ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN FOR FISCAL YEARS 2015 AND 2016, at 48, 63 (2015).  The
document does not explain how the measure was generated.
17 Whereas the 2014 annual report reports that the FTC returned $38.58
million to consumers, the 2014 Annual Highlights featured prominently on the
website report $65.2 million, a considerably higher figure. See id. at 63; Stats &
Data 2014, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/annual-highlights-
2014/stats-data-2014 [http://perma.cc/WD3K-6SVZ].
18 For example, in the 2014 annual report, the FTC measures the “[a]mount
of money the FTC returned to consumers and forwarded to the U.S. Treasury.”
U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 16, at 63 (emphasis added).  Only a close R
reading of the methodology section reveals that the reported figure ($66.9 million)
combines monies paid to consumers as compensation ($38.58 million) and
amounts that were not distributed to consumers but were remitted to the U.S.
Treasury ($28.27 million). See id.
19 The CFTC reports only two metrics regarding enforcement.  The first metric
measures what share of investigations is closed within twelve months of opening.
It shows declining performance in recent years and will be changed in the next
year to measure investigations closed within eighteen months of opening.  The
second metric shows that the CFTC cooperates with criminal prosecutors and
other agencies in 100% of investigations, well above target.  But a close reading of
the methodology reveals that the CFTC excluded from the denominator all cases
that were not referred.  By definition, all other cases were in fact referred, thus
showing the CFTC’s 100% success. See U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N,
supra note 3, at 52–53. R
20 Developing better measures for recording enforcement output is beyond
the scope of this Article.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-4\CRN401.txt unknown Seq: 6  4-MAY-16 11:55
906 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:901
in formats and categories that are not meaningful is a waste of
resources and of opportunities to learn and improve both en-
forcement and rulemaking.  Second, and of more immediate
interest to legislators, agencies report their activities to Con-
gress during budget appropriation season and repeat them
during testimony before congressional oversight committees.21
In fact, federal agencies are required to report their perform-
ance under a series of federal statutes introduced to improve
agency reporting and the efficiency of federal programs.22  The
appropriations process, coupled with unreasonable congres-
sional expectations, reward agencies that report ever-increas-
ing figures.23  That agencies massage their numbers reveals
that excessive oversight can be counterproductive.  Finally, the
2008 financial crisis prompted greater collaboration among fi-
nancial and securities regulators both domestically and inter-
nationally.  As part of the effort, international organizations
have spearheaded efforts to develop best practices.  Fuzzy
numbers make comparisons between one agency’s perform-
ance with that of its peers impossible.24
21 See, e.g., Examining the SEC’s Agenda, Operations, and FY Budget Re-
quest: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 114th Cong. (2015) (statement
of Mary Jo White, Chair, Securities and Exchange Commission), http://financial-
services.house.gov/uploadedfiles/114-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/NW6R-3XMF]
(mentioning the SEC’s enforcement numbers for 2014 to justify a budget increase
for fiscal 2016); Oversight of the SEC’s Agenda, Operations, and FY 2015 Budget
Request: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. (2014) (state-
ment of Mary Jo White, Chair, Securities and Exchange Commission), http://
financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/113-75.pdf [https://perma.cc/79DL-
KSU4] (noting the SEC’s enforcement statistics in fiscal 2013 to justify a budget
increase in fiscal 2015).
22 See discussion infra section I.B.
23 See Jonathan G. Katz, Reviewing the SEC, Reinvigorating the SEC, 71 U.
PITT. L. REV. 489, 506 (2010) (“Because people strive to achieve the results that are
measured, the choice of measures strongly determines what people try to do.
When an agency uses faulty measures to evaluate its staff, it rewards the wrong
people for the wrong actions.”).
24 The SEC is an active member of the International Organization of Securi-
ties Commissions (IOSCO).  To demonstrate compliance with international stan-
dards, the SEC is required to report to IOSCO.  In its report, the SEC must outline
its enforcement activities in the various areas of its supervision, including finan-
cial reporting, market manipulation, insider trading, and securities offering fraud.
See IMF, Detailed Assessment of Implementation: IOSCO Objectives and Principles
of Securities Regulation, Country Report: United States 21–30 (Mar. 2015).  The
SEC reports its aggregate enforcement figures, which this Article shows to be
misleading.  The reported figures overstate enforcement activity, sometimes by
nearly 50%, and show false trends.  See id. at 94.  While the report stated that the
SEC brought 144 enforcement actions related to securities offering violations in
FY 2010, my research revealed that sixty-nine of those were follow-on cases. See
infra Tables 3A & 3C; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact
of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229, 269 (2007) (comparing SEC enforcement
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The study reported in this Article thus contributes to two
important debates in law and public policy: the debate about
the tools and methods of agency accountability and the debate
about the relationship among legal rules, their enforcement,
and economic growth.  Rulemaking and congressional, presi-
dential, and judicial oversight of rulemaking have attracted a
disproportionate share of theoretical and empirical scholarship
on agency accountability.25  By contrast, enforcement remains
understudied.26  While enforcement theory is quite rich,27 em-
pirical studies of both agency performance in enforcement and
of deterrent effects of enforcement remain a rare breed,28 with
actions with similar enforcement actions in the U.K. without adjusting the U.S.
figures).
25 See, e.g., Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An
Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 824 (2003) (presenting an empiri-
cal study of White House review of agency rulemaking); Nestor M. Davidson &
Ethan J. Leib, Regleprudence—At OIRA and Beyond, 103 GEO. L.J. 259, 264
(2015) (analyzing agency lawmaking); Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell,
The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1140–41 (2014)
(describing modern administrative rulemaking); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz
Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Con-
gressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901,
906–08 (2013) (studying the impact the canons of statutory interpretation have
on members of Congress in drafting legislation); Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insula-
tion Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1757–58, 1784 (2013)
(studying presidential review of agency rulemaking); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R.
Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7 (1995) (evaluat-
ing President Clinton’s efforts to reform the regulatory state).
26 This was true in 1990, when Cass Sunstein complained that “even the
most prominent evaluations of the performance of the regulatory state . . . .[are]
conspicuously silent on the question” of the real-world consequences of agency
activities, and remains true today.  Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory
State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407, 408 (1990).
27 See James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the
Securities Laws, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 115, 118 (2012) (suggesting that studies of
securities enforcement have relied “heavily on economic theories of enforcement”
without much empirical grounding); see also Kate Andrias, The President’s En-
forcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1033–34 (2013) (discussing the Presi-
dent’s formal and informal influence over agency enforcement); Jennifer Arlen &
Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate
Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 692 (1997) (discussing enforcement and
efficiency goals of corporate liability); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 207–09 (1968) (developing law and
economics model of criminal sanctioning); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Opti-
mal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior, 102 J. POL. ECON. 583,
601–02 (1994) (same).
28 See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Adminis-
trative Law Exile: Problems With Its Structure and Function and Suggestions for
Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2028–33 (2009) (studying NLRB’s enforcement over a
decade-long period); Richard A. Posner, The Behavior of Administrative Agencies,
1 J. LEGAL STUD. 305, 305 (1972) (studying agency enforcement choices).
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the exception of a handful of recent papers that have studied
small slices of agency enforcement.29
But enforcement is at least as important as the rules that
agencies adopt to further their goals.  Unlike rulemaking,
which happens episodically,30 enforcement is continuous.  The
business press closely follows and reports on enforcement, in
particular securities enforcement.31  Enforcement is also politi-
cally significant.32  The SEC, the focus of this study, is regu-
29 See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Anat Carmy Wiechman & A. C. Pritchard, Scan-
dal Enforcement at the SEC: The Arc of the Option Backdating Investigations, 15
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 542, 547–52 (2013) (studying the options backdating scan-
dals); James D. Cox et al., SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53
DUKE L.J. 737, 763–77 (2003) (studying concurrent SEC and private enforcement
of accounting fraud); Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evi-
dence From Enforcement Against Broker-Dealers, 67 BUS. LAW. 679, 693–700
(2012) (studying SEC enforcement against broker-dealers); Jonathan M. Karpoff,
D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Value of Foreign Bribery to Bribe Paying
Firms 13–18 (June 16, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1573222 [https://
perma.cc/TRE2-BT43] (studying the consequences of DOJ and SEC enforcement
for firms caught for bribery).  Karpoff, Lee, and Martin have also published a
series of three papers on SEC and DOJ enforcement of financial manipulation.
One recent exception is a forthcoming study by David Zaring.  David Zaring,
Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
30 The SEC files many enforcement actions every week. See Litigation Re-
leases, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/litigation/li-
treleases.shtml [https://perma.cc/GTN5-XLLM] (listing all litigation releases filed
during the current calendar year).  The SEC proposed only ten new rules and
amendments to existing rules in all of 2014. See SEC Proposed Rules: 2014, U.S.
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/proposedar
chive/proposed2014.shtml [https://perma.cc/3WQP-JNJL].
31 The press has closely tracked SEC enforcement for several decades. See,
e.g., Judith Burns & Kara Scannell, Moving the Market: SEC Brings Fewer En-
forcement Cases, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2006, at C3 (reporting on an 8–10% decline
in SEC enforcement actions in 2006); Jean Eaglesham, Easy Prey Pads SEC
Numbers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2013, at C1 (reporting that the SEC brought
several dozen follow-on cases in September 2013, possibly to boost enforcement
numbers reported in fiscal 2013); Joshua Gallu, Data: SEC Inflates Enforcement
Tally, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2013, at A11 (suggesting that follow-on and delinquent
filing cases inflate the overall enforcement tally); Walter Hamilton, SEC Setting
Record Investigation Pace, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2002), http://articles.latimes.
com/2002/feb/23/business/fi-sec23 [http://perma.cc/H3HE-DDWW] (report-
ing that SEC enforcement had been steadily increasing between 1998 and 2002);
Bruce Ingersoll, Inundated Agency: Busy SEC Must Let Many Cases, Filings Go
Uninvestigated, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 1985, at A1 (reporting that a Congressman
from Michigan was “especially concerned” about a 10% decline in SEC enforce-
ment actions between 1984 and 1985); Sarah Johnson, SEC Enforcement Declines
8.9 Percent, CFO.COM (Nov. 3, 2006), http://ww2.cfo.com/risk-compliance/
2006/11/sec-enforcement-declines-8-9-percent/ [http://perma.cc/PSY7-V39R]
(noting a steady decline in enforcement actions taken by the SEC from 2004 to
2006).
32 The SEC prominently features enforcement successes in annual reports
and budget justifications. See Anne Krishnan, Lead by Example, SEC Chief Tells
CEOs, THE HERALD-SUN (Durham), Oct. 23, 2002, at A1 (reporting on Chair Harvey
Pitt’s speech in which he referenced the SEC’s enforcement figures); Amit R. Paley
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-4\CRN401.txt unknown Seq: 9  4-MAY-16 11:55
2016] REPORTING AGENCY PERFORMANCE 909
larly called to testify in Congress after scandals and failures of
enforcement.33  It must annually report on its enforcement per-
formance to Congress and the President, and must “use objec-
tive metrics to justify its request for budget increases.”34  The
Government Accountability Office, the congressional investiga-
tive arm, regularly relies on agencies’ reported figures to assess
and propose improvements in agencies’ work.35  Finally, en-
forcement is economically significant.  The SEC uses its en-
forcement to communicate to market participants what is
appropriate behavior.36  Legal academics routinely rely on re-
ported enforcement statistics to offer their assessments of the
SEC’s performance and propose changes to enforcement prac-
tices.37  Law firms regularly issue reports using the SEC’s en-
& David S. Hilzenrath, SEC Chief Defends His Restraint, WASH. POST, Dec. 24,
2008, at A1 (reporting that Chair Christopher Cox referenced the number of
enforcement cases brought under his reign to defend his tenure); Michael Schroe-
der, Bush Defends Pitt Amid Calls for Resignation, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2002, at
A6 (quoting President George W. Bush’s press secretary Ari Fleischer as defending
the SEC’s successes, in particular the “record number of enforcement actions”
brought); Deborah Solomon, SEC Changes Its Sleuthing, Uses Wider Net, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 18, 2004, at C1 (reporting that SEC “enforcement attorneys were judged
on the number of cases they brought”); SEC Chief on Warpath Against Illicit
Insider Trading, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), May 29, 1984, at B11 (suggesting that
enforcement against insider trading had helped the Reagan Administration “that
is often accused of favoring business to look more even-handed”).
33 For an analysis of political forces that shape securities enforcement, see
Urska Velikonja, Politics in Securities Enforcement, 50 GA. L. REV. 17 (2015) [here-
inafter Velikonja, Politics in Securities Enforcement].
34 John C. Coffee, Jr., SEC Enforcement: What Has Gone Wrong?, CLS BLUE
SKY BLOG (Jan. 2, 2013), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/01/02/sec-
enforcement-what-has-gone-wrong/ [http://perma.cc/K9BW-UH6C]; see also
Bruce Carton, SEC’s White Squares Off With Senate Committee Over FY 2016
Budget, COMPLIANCE WEEK BLOG (May 8, 2015), https://www.complianceweek.
com/blogs/enforcement-action/secs-white-squares-off-with-senate-committee-
over-fy-2016-budget#.VZ7C0caqqko [http://perma.cc/ZM6B-V2D2] (reporting
that Chair White requested a 15% increase in the SEC’s budget for 2016).
35 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-358, SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION: GREATER ATTENTION NEEDED TO ENHANCE COMMUNICATION AND
UTILIZATION OF RESOURCES IN THE DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT 2 (2009) (reporting that
the GAO obtained data from the SEC on, among other things, the number of
enforcement actions brought, the distribution of enforcement actions by cases
type, and annual amounts in penalties and disgorgements ordered).
36 See Katz, supra note 23, at 491 (describing that in the 1960s the SEC R
began using enforcement actions “to guide and instruct market professionals”).
37 See, e.g., Coffee, Jr., supra note 24, at 262 (comparing SEC-reported statis- R
tics with those in the U.K. and Germany); Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the
Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications,
24 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 280, 283 (2007) [hereinafter Jackson, Variation] (using the
SEC’s data on enforcement actions without adjustment, thus overstating SEC
enforcement by about 200 actions per year); Howell E. Jackson, Regulatory Inten-
sity in the Regulation of Capital Markets: A Preliminary Comparison of Canadian
and U.S. Approaches, in 6 CANADA STEPS UP, TASK FORCE TO MODERNIZE SECURITIES
LEGISLATION IN CANADA 75, 113, 120 fig.5 (2006), http://www.tfmsl.ca/docs/
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forcement statistics to warn clients about future legal risks.38
Flawed reporting thus has the potential to lead agencies to
implement changes that are unnecessary and obscure real
problems that ought to be addressed.39  This Article thus pulls
back the curtain on the problems with agency reporting of their
enforcement performance.
The second area of research to which this Article contrib-
utes is the study of the relationship between legal rules and
their enforcement, and economic growth.  Using international
comparisons, a vibrant debate is ongoing in the financial and
legal circles about whether and how legal rules or enforcement
contribute to the development of financial markets.  The first
set of studies suggested that the “law on the books” mattered
more than enforcement,40 spurring significant investment in
studying and developing efficient rules to support capital mar-
ket development.41  Subsequent studies argued that such con-
clusions were not supported by the data42 nor warranted.43
Studies of enforcement emerged, first looking at formal rules
regarding enforcement agencies’ sanctioning powers,44 fol-
lowed by studies analyzing resources dedicated to enforce-
ment,45 and finally by studies comparing enforcement
V6(2)%20Jackson.pdf [https://perma.cc/467C-7TE5] (same) [hereinafter Jack-
son, Regulatory Intensity].  For adjusted numbers, see infra Table 3B.
38 See infra note 311. R
39 The Veterans Health Administration reporting scandal is an example of
how manipulated results obscured a real problem in the V.A. See Richard A.
Oppel, Jr. & Michael D. Shear, Severe Report Finds V.A. Hid Waiting Lists, N.Y.
TIMES, May 29, 2014, at A1.
40 See Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J.
FINANCE 1131, 1149 (1997) (concluding that legal rules and enforcement impact
the size and extent of a country’s financial market); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and
Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1116 (1998) (same); see also Coffee, Jr., supra
note 24, at 243–44 (discussing La Porta’s focus on the “law on the books”). R
41 See generally WORLD BANK, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS
1 (2006), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTOPACCFINSER/Resources/
Institutional.pdf [http://perma.cc/VX3A-AEC9] (concluding that “private moni-
toring and enforcement drive development more than public enforcement
measures”).
42 Holger Spamann, On the Insignificance and/or Endogeneity of La Porta et
al.’s ‘Anti-Director Rights Index’ Under Consistent Coding, JOHN M. OLIN CTR. FOR L.
ECON. & BUS. FELLOWS’ DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, no. 7, 2006, at 68, http://
www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/fellows_papers/pdf/
Spamann_7.pdf [http://perma.cc/WB2C-6J9C].
43 See Coffee, Jr., supra note 24, at 247–48 n.39 (explaining that the La Porta
et al. methodology attracted considerable criticism).
44 See Rafael La Porta et al., What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FINANCE 1,
27–28 (2006).
45 See Jackson, Variation, supra note 37, at 280, 283 (using the SEC’s data R
on enforcement actions without adjustment, thus overstating SEC enforcement
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outputs.46  Prominent academics have suggested that compar-
ing enforcement efforts across nations is difficult because en-
forcement agencies have different jurisdictions, different
priorities, and different rates of misconduct.47  This Article pro-
poses that the list of challenges is incomplete: different juris-
dictions also measure their enforcement output differently.48
High quality data collection on enforcement output should be a
priority in any effort to compare enforcement intensity across
nations, as well as within nations across various industries.
The pilot study reported in this Article is a step in that
direction.
The Article proceeds in five parts.  Part I provides an over-
view of agency reporting, the legal requirements for agency re-
porting, and the challenges of reporting on nonfinancial
measures related to agency performance.  Part II provides de-
tails on the SEC’s reporting requirements, and explains how
the data were collected and analyzed.  Parts III and IV are the
substantive core of the study.  By studying the SEC’s reporting
practices from fiscal years 2000 to 2014, Part III exposes signif-
icant problems with the validity and reliability of the metrics
that the SEC, Congress, the press, and legal commentators
widely use to evaluate the SEC’s enforcement.  By recoding
enforcement figures to eliminate double counting, Part IV sug-
gests some of the consequences of biased reporting, including
overstatement of the enforcement effort, metrics that suggest
false trends and non-existent problems as well as obscure real
problems, performance indicators that do not measure what
they set out to measure, and distorted enforcement priorities.
In Part V, the Article finally proposes several steps to improve
agency reporting of their enforcement output.  Agencies like the
SEC are under considerable pressure from Congress to in-
crease their enforcement output year after year without addi-
tional appropriations, so perhaps it should come as no surprise
by 200 actions per year); Jackson, Regulatory Intensity, supra note 37, at 113, R
120 fig.5 (same).  For adjusted numbers, see infra Table 3B.
46 See Coffee, Jr., supra note 24, at 262 (comparing enforcement statistics R
between Germany, the U.K., and the U.S.); Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe,
Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-based Evidence, 93 J.
FIN. ECON. 207, 237 (2009) (proposing that the World Bank or another agency
begin collecting data on enforcement activity, including the number of cases filed).
47 Coffee, Jr., supra note 24, at 263 (“[S]ecurities regulators have very differ- R
ent jurisdictions and may have different priorities in terms of what they wish to
prosecute.”).
48 See Holger Spamann, Empirical Comparative Law, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 131, 131 (2015)  (suggesting that collecting data of high quality is crucially
important for cross-country comparative work).
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that agencies sometimes fudge the numbers to meet unreason-
able expectations.  The Article considers two possible re-
sponses: reduce the pressure on agencies by decoupling the
budget process from reported enforcement output, and out-
source and possibly standardize reporting conventions.  Fi-
nally, the Article proposes that agencies share more liberally
data on enforcement.  Doing so would add credibility to their




It is difficult to manage what is not measured.  Reporting
systems are thus put in place to monitor how well an organiza-
tion and individuals within it are pursuing their “mission.”49
Without reporting, the organization does not know whether
and to what extent it accomplished what it set out to do, and
when to change course.50  Companies report to enable manag-
ers and investors to evaluate how well the company is meeting
its goals.  Reporting is at least as important for government
agencies.  It is a precondition for deploying other accountability
measures, including evaluating whether government officials,
be they legislators, bureaucrats, or judges, act in the citizens’
interests, ensuring that administrative agencies enforce policy
consistent with legislative and presidential priorities, and for
replacing agents that do not perform.51
Despite its obvious importance, reporting is controversial.
You get what you measure.  And what is measured is managed
and rewarded, often to the exclusion of qualities that cannot be
measured.52
B. The Legal Foundations of Agency Reporting
Agencies generally do not have the choice whether to re-
port.  Federal agencies’ organic acts require that they prepare
annual reports and present them to authorizing congressional
49 S.K. Bhattacharyya, Management Reporting Systems: Structure and De-
sign, ECON. & POL. WKLY, May 29, 1971, at M-67.
50 See id.
51 Jacob E. Gersen & Matthew C. Stephenson, Over-Accountability, 6 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 185, 186 (2014); see also Jordan Ellenberg, How Not to Be Misled by
Data, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-not-to-be-
misled-by-data-1435258933 [https://perma.cc/EU7R-TDLY] (“Unfortunately,
numbers turn out to be a lot like words: powerful and illuminating but capable of
being deployed to bad ends.”).
52 See infra Part I.C.
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committees that oversee their work.53  Such reports are to in-
clude “whatever information, data, and recommendations for
further legislation” that the agency considers relevant.54  In
addition, many federal agencies must report at least annually
to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate
Committee on Appropriations.55  The executive, agency heads,
and spending committees submit reports, assessments, and
views of existing programs and expected costs.56  Based on
submitted information, each Appropriations Committee adopts
a budget resolution, which is then translated into committee
allocations and ultimately delivered to authorizing congres-
sional committees.57
The adoption of the Government Performance and Results
Act of 1993 (the Results Act) reinforced agency reporting.  The
Results Act was one in a series of statutes designed to improve
government performance by reducing “waste and inefficiency”
and by “holding Federal agencies accountable for achieving
program results.”58  Influenced by private-sector management
practices,59 it requires agencies to set performance goals,60
measure performance results, and to report the results annu-
ally to the President and Congress.61  The goals are to be ex-
pressed in “objective, quantifiable, and measurable form,” and
agencies are instructed to develop performance indicators that
are to be used in measuring and assessing agency output and
53 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78w(b)(1) (2012) (requiring the SEC, the Federal
Reserve, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation to report annually to Congress); 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (2012) (authorizing
the Federal Trade Commission to report annually to Congress).
54 15 U.S.C. § 78w(b)(1) (2012).
55 Velikonja, Politics in Securities Enforcement, supra note 33, at 4–5.  Of R
financial enforcement agencies, only the SEC and the CFTC must report to the
appropriations committees.  Other financial enforcement agencies, including
FINRA, the Fed, the FDIC, the OCC, etc. are not funded with budget appropria-
tions and thus do not appear before congressional appropriations committees.
See id. at 5.
56 See Nancy Staudt, Redundant Tax and Spending Programs, 100 NW. U. L.
REV. 1197, 1243–44 (2006).
57 Id.
58 Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–62,
§ 2(a)–(b), 107 Stat. 285, 285 (1993).  The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010
amended the Results Act in early 2011. See H.R. 2142, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010); 5
U.S.C. § 306(a) (2012).
59 See Mary L. Heen, Reinventing Tax Expenditure Reform: Improving Program
Oversight Under the Government Performance and Results Act, 35 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 751, 768 n.60, 769 (2000) (describing the motivation behind government
reforms).
60 H.R. 2142 § 3; 31 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (2012).
61 H.R. 2142 § 3; 31 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (2012).
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the outcomes of their activities.62  If an agency misses a per-
formance target, it must report its failure to the Office of Man-
agement and Budget (OMB) and submit an improvement
plan.63  If an agency misses a performance target two years in a
row, it must submit to Congress what it plans to do to improve
performance, including what statutory changes it would pro-
pose, and what additional funding it would request.64  If, how-
ever, an agency misses a performance target three years in a
row, the OMB may propose to Congress to terminate the pro-
gram or reduce its budget.65  In the era of post-financial crisis
austerity, appropriations committees have been loath to in-
crease agency budgets.66
The Results Act and other reporting statutes cover a wide
variety of agencies, from the largest departments to the Peace
Corps.67  Agencies are required to report financial and nonfi-
nancial performance.  The OMB has standardized financial re-
porting.68  But for most agencies, measures of financial
performance are not terribly useful in evaluating how well
agencies are meeting their goals.69  Nonfinancial measures of
performance are far more pertinent,70 yet what and how nonfi-
nancial performance is measured is largely within considerable
agency discretion.71
62 Results Act § 4(b), 107 Stat. 285, 287–89.
63 31 U.S.C. § 1116(g) (2012).
64 31 U.S.C. § 1116(h)(1) (2012).
65 31 U.S.C. § 1116(i) (2012).
66 See, e.g., Appropriations Committee Approves the Fiscal Year 2016 Labor,
Health and Human Services Funding Bill, HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE (June
24, 2015), http://appropriations.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?Docu
mentID=394290 [https://perma.cc/8FZD-74FW] (describing the Committee’s at-
tempts to reduce federal discretionary spending).
67 See generally THE PEACE CORPS, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT:
FISCAL YEAR 2014 (reporting the Peace Corps’ annual performance).
68 See generally OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
CIRCULAR NO. A-134, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS (1993) (stan-
dardizing annual performance reports); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR NO. A-136, FINANCIAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS (2014)
(same).
69 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-97-138, MANAGING FOR RESULTS:
ANALYTIC CHALLENGES IN MEASURING PERFORMANCE 3 (1997) (“[Agencies often] recog-
nized that simple examination of [fiscal] . . . measures would not accurately reflect
their program’s performance . . . .”).
70 It is useful, for example, to know what percentage of monetary penalties
that the SEC imposes are actually collected. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FY
2014 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT & FY 2016 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN 43 (2015)
(reporting that the SEC collected in FY 2014 $2,109 million of $4,166 million
ordered) [hereinafter SEC, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT].
71 For example, the SEC selects performance goals on the basis of the four-
year strategic plan, which it drafts.  In addition, the SEC itself defines the mea-
sures of performance.  For example, it would be very useful to know in what
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The GAO reported very early after the adoption of the Re-
sults Act that translating agency performance into concrete,
objective measures would be difficult.72  The complicated
structure of government can impede the collection of relevant
data.73  There are no useful proxies for measuring certain gov-
ernment functions.74  OMB circulars provide more detailed gui-
dance on reporting.  Circular A-11, for example, requires
agencies to report data that is complete, reliable, and of high
quality.75  It instructs agencies to note data limitations, includ-
ing incomplete data, imprecise measurement, and inconsisten-
cies in data collection practices,76 yet considerable problems
remain.
C. Measuring Performance
In order to be effective, a reporting system must produce
information that is reliable, comprehensive, meaningful, and
comparable.  Reporting conventions that do not satisfy these
requirements are useless, or worse.77
percentage of enforcement actions brought does an agency obtain relief on at least
one of the claims.  The SEC reports in its 2014 Performance and Accountability
Report that it obtained such relief in 94% of the enforcement actions it brought.
See id. at 39.  But the term “enforcement action” lumps together regulatory activi-
ties that are very different: trading suspensions when a firm has failed to file
periodic financial reports are required by statute; follow-on disbarments and sus-
pensions brought on the basis of a prior enforcement action that the SEC settled;
and true new enforcement actions.  The SEC’s success rate in the latter category
is considerably lower than in the first two, so reporting overall success rates is
quite meaningless.  See discussion infra Part IV.E.
72 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-10.1.20, THE RESULTS ACT: AN EVALU-
ATOR’S GUIDE TO ASSESSING AGENCY ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLANS 9–10 (1998) [herein-
after GAO GUIDE].
73 See id. at 10; see also GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MANAGING FOR RESULTS,
supra note 69, at 3 (“Sometimes selecting an outcome measure was impeded . . . R
by anticipated data collection problems.”).
74 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MANAGING FOR RESULTS, supra note 69, at R
3. (“For some [agencies], the concept of ‘outcome’ was unfamiliar and difficult
especially for program officials focused on day-to-day activities.”).
75 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR NO. A-
11, PREPARATION, SUBMISSION, AND EXECUTION OF THE BUDGET § 260.9 (2015).
76 Id.
77 See, e.g., Neil Weinberg, We Tried to Re-Create JPMorgan’s Mutual Fund
Returns and Gave Up, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 5, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2015-03-05/we-tried-to-re-create-jpmorgan-s-top-mutual-fund-
returns-and-just-gave-up [http://perma.cc/QB5R-GCWX] (reporting that JPMor-
gan Chase’s complicated method of calculating mutual fund performance made it
difficult to compare them with other funds).
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Agency goals are usually described in terms of general out-
comes: safety,78 public health,79 election integrity,80 and inves-
tor protection.81  Ideally, an agency could describe and
measure its own impact, directly or indirectly.82  For example,
a tech start-up uses the number of new users it attracts as a
key performance indicator—a direct performance measure.83  A
mature public firm measures its performance by reporting its
earnings, EBITDA, and the stock price.84
But measuring the impact of one agency’s varied activities
is both difficult and confounded by other changes in the econ-
omy or the environment that cannot easily be controlled for.
Failing measuring the agency’s own impact, tracking changes
in the overall quality can be reasonably informative, in particu-
lar where other underlying factors either have not changed or
can be identified and accurately recorded.  Some agencies, like
the EPA, can measure directly some of the aggregate environ-
mental outcomes.85  For example, the EPA reports on air qual-
ity by measuring the ambient concentration of fine particulate
matter;86 and on water quality by measuring the number of
78 See U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, 2011–2016 STRATEGIC PLAN 12
(2010).
79 See Mission, Role and Pledge, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL (Apr. 14, 2014),
http://www.cdc.gov/about/organization/mission.htm [http://perma.cc/6M7V-
UUDR].
80 See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FY 2014-2019 STRATEGIC PLAN 1 (2014).
81 SEC, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 70, at 7; U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES R
TRADING COMM’N, supra note 3, at 12. R
82 See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 2029, 2084 (2005).
83 See Devika Krishna Kumar & Yasmeen Abutaleb, Twitter Shares Fall as
Growth of Monthly Users Slows, REUTERS (July 28, 2015, 9:14 PM), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/29/us-twitter-results-idUSKCN0Q22DR20
150729 [http://perma.cc/5KJX-WQ68].
84 See, e.g., Apple Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 23–24 (Oct. 27, 2014)
(reporting Apple’s stock price and select financial data from 2009 to 2013).
85 The outcomes will be the product of the EPA’s actions as well as many
other factors, and so are not a direct measure of the EPA’s performance.  But
there is no doubt that regulation has had a considerable and lasting effect on air
and water quality. See Sunstein, supra note 26, at 409–10.  OSHA, likewise, R
reports overall workplace deaths and injuries over time and they have declined
since 1970. See Occupational Safety & Health Admin., Worker Fatalities Reported
to Federal and State OSHA, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, https://www.osha.gov/dep/fatcat/
dep_fatcat.html [https://perma.cc/2EMA-G2J6] (“Before OSHA was created 43
years ago, an estimated 14,000 workers were killed on the job every year. Today,
workplaces are much safer and healthier, going from 38 fatal injuries a day to
12.”).  Some of the decline is due to technological change and some due to OSHA’s
oversight and enforcement, but it may be impossible to flesh out relative
contributions.
86 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FISCAL YEAR 2016: JUSTIFICATION OF APPROPRIATION
ESTIMATES FOR THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 1090 (2015), http://www2.
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months during which drinking water met all applicable health-
based standards.87  By also supplying information on changes
in variables that increase fine particulates, such as the number
of miles driven, one can make an educated assessment of the
EPA’s contribution to improved air quality.88
Unfortunately, most agencies cannot measure and report
outcomes regularly or with any precision.89  Data regarding
outcomes is often difficult to collect reliably.90  Even more
often, outcomes cannot be quantified in a useful way.  For ex-
ample, the Peace Corps’ mission is to promote “world peace and
friendship.”91  Neither world peace nor friendship can be ade-
quately measured directly, and are measured poorly indirectly.
The Peace Corps uses cross-cultural connections as a proxy for
friendship, and relies on volunteers’ reports that they facili-
tated contact between an American and a local as a perform-
ance indicator.92
When outcomes cannot be measured directly, agencies re-
port their output—the number of major rulemakings con-
ducted, the number of seminars organized, the number of
investigations opened, the magnitude of penalties collected93—
and their input, such as the size of agency enforcement staffs
and budgets.  For example, the SEC’s goal is to protect market
participants and the public through a robust enforcement pro-
gram.94  Much of financial misconduct cannot be observed and
epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-02/documents/fy_2014_apr.pdf [http://
perma.cc/PHC5-X42N].
87 Id. at 1102.  Data collection is costly so agencies’ data is sometimes unreli-
able, not collected, or not reported in a manner that would be useful. See
Jonathan C. Borck, Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Environmental Leadership
Programs: Toward an Empirical Assessment of Their Performance, 35 ECOLOGY L.
Q. 771, 772 (2008).
88 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 86, at 1089. R
89 See generally Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1345 (2003) (showing how regulatory scorecards routinely overstate the
costs of government activities by several orders of magnitude).
90 See Eric Biber, The Problem of Environmental Monitoring, 83 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1, 18–22 (2011) (reporting that data is unavailable in ambient monitoring).
91 THE PEACE CORPS, supra note 67, at iii. R
92 See id. at 59–61.
93 See GAO GUIDE, supra note 72, at 16; see also Vandenbergh, supra note R
82, at 2084 (criticizing output reporting). R
94 In efficiency terms, the goals should be to enforce to the point to where the
next dollar spent on enforcement yields the benefit of at least one dollar.  By that
measure, SEC enforcement levels are currently much too low. See generally
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the
Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 162 fig.9 (2011) (showing that per dollar spent, SEC
enforcement yields at least $6.20 in fines).
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measured directly.95  Even for the small subset of public secur-
ities that trade in efficient markets, the securities’ price will
reflect only publicly available information, not nonpublic infor-
mation, such as undiscovered financial misconduct.96  And so
the SEC reports its output: the number of initiated investiga-
tions, the percentage of successful enforcement actions, and
the amount of collected monetary penalties.97  Output mea-
sures in enforcement are a product of several factors, including
(1) the prevalence of misconduct as well as (2) the agency’s
ability to detect and prosecute such misconduct.  Accounting
fraud and offering frauds such as Ponzi schemes are highly
cyclical: both types of violations are much more common to-
wards the end of investment booms than otherwise.98  Even if
detection and prosecution rates remained the same, one would
expect significant variation in enforcement figures from year to
year, as a byproduct of investment boom-and-bust cycles.  As a
result, aggregate enforcement numbers are a very noisy proxy
for how effectively the agency conducts its work.99
Output measures are problematic when used to report on
the agency’s impact on outcomes, but output measures have
additional limitations.  First, poorly selected output measures
can shift the focus from things that cannot be measured to
those that can.100  An agency that is rewarded for the number
95 See, e.g., Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, How Pervasive is
Corporate Fraud? 2–4 (Rotman Sch. Of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 2222608,
2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2222608 [https://perma.cc/6G3C-
ABQH] (trying to estimate the prevalence of undetected accounting fraud and
noting that it cannot be measured directly).
96 See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and
Empirical Work, 25 J. FINANCE 383, 409–10 (1970) (explaining that stock prices do
not reflect all information, and that individuals with monopolistic access to infor-
mation can profit trading on it).
97 See SEC, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 70, at 37, 43. R
98 See Tracy Yue Wang & Andrew Winton, Industry Informational Interac-
tions and Corporate Fraud 24 (Jan. 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://
www.tc.umn.edu/~wangx684/assets/documents/research/Competition-and-
Corporate-Fraud.pdf [https://perma.cc/XCX5-U7AM] (showing that fraud rates
increase during investment booms).
99 See Jean Eaglesham, As SEC Enforcement Cases Rise, Big Actions Are
Sparse, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/as-sec-en-
forcement-cases-rise-big-actions-are-sparse-1412028262 [https://perma.cc/
P3P4-GH6S] (quoting former SEC attorney Bradley Bondi for the proposition that
enforcement statistics are a poor measure of how effectively the SEC deters
misconduct).
100 See David A. Super, Are Rights Efficient? Challenging the Managerial Cri-
tique of Individual Rights, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1108 (2005) (reporting that the
USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service which used to bring together “state agencies’
staffs for annual discussions of a wide range of food stamp administrative issues,
now convened dedicated ‘payment accuracy conferences’ each year”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-4\CRN401.txt unknown Seq: 19  4-MAY-16 11:55
2016] REPORTING AGENCY PERFORMANCE 919
of enforcement actions it brings may bring enforcement actions
that are easier to prosecute instead of actions that require more
time and effort, even if the impact of the latter would be
greater.101  Second, agencies select metrics on which they are
measured.102  Because the consequence of an agency’s failure
to meet a performance metric can be a reduced budget, agen-
cies set themselves easy-to-satisfy goals.103  This Article is not
the first to suggest that because of the threat to cut their budg-
ets, agencies report “statistics that are puzzling at best and
misleading at worst because they suggest the Agency is making
progress when it is not.”104  Third, metrics used often conflate
apples with oranges.  The SEC’s enforcement statistics dis-
cussed in Parts II, III, and IV are only one such example.105
Finally, sometimes agencies outright misreport to avoid
sanctions.106
Despite all of these problems, agency reporting remains
important and useful.  In particular, comparing valid and relia-
ble enforcement statistics of one agency to overall indicators
over a longer period of time can provide useful information
about the value of various enforcement techniques.107  Com-
paring enforcement strategies and successes across agencies
can yield insights into what else might work to increase compli-
ance efficiently and effectively.
II
A STUDY OF SEC REPORTING
The SEC has reported on its enforcement since it was cre-
ated in 1934.108  Its reports are thorough and provide not only
101 See Posner, supra note 28, at 311–12. R
102 Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–62,
§ 4(b), 107 Stat. 285, 287–89 (1993).
103 See Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena Steinzor, Capture, Accountability, and Regu-
latory Metrics, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1744 (2008).
104 Id. at 1764.
105 Commentators have had no difficulty finding other examples. See, e.g.,
Mary De Ming Fan, Disciplining Criminal Justice: The Peril Amid the Promise of
Numbers, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 26 (2007) (discussing that officers face
incentives that bias policing in favor of petty traffic violations at the expense of
more serious violations that take longer to process).
106 The Veterans Health Administration reporting scandal is an example of
how manipulated results obscured a real problem in the VA. See Oppel, Jr. &
Shear, supra note 39, at A1. R
107 For example, before the creation of OSHA and federal regulation of work-
place safety in 1970, there were 14,000 workplace deaths per year (20 per
100,000 workers).  In 2013, 4,585 people died on the job (3.3 per 100,000 work-
ers). See Occupational Safety & Health Admin., supra note 85. R
108 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION: FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1935, at 67–70 (1935).
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aggregate information and summaries of high-interest cases,
but also a complete list of enforcement actions filed.109  The
SEC is also among the agencies whose enforcement record has
been of particular interest to Congress and the general pub-
lic.110  Both factors make the SEC an appropriate target for a
study of an agency’s reporting conventions.
Critiques of SEC enforcement routinely revolve around
mishandling particular cases,111 such as failing to uncover the
Madoff Ponzi scheme112 or the Enron fraud.113  The Commis-
sion’s usual retort is to highlight its overall enforcement re-
cord.114  Reported SEC enforcement figures regularly grab
newspaper headlines and capture the attention of Congress
both during budget appropriation season and in post-scandal
testimonies.115
The SEC’s overall enforcement reporting is particularly
worthy of studying because the agency is very active and its
leadership very proud of the agency’s enforcement prowess.116
109 See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA FISCAL
2014, at 3–20 tbls.2–3 (2015) (reporting aggregate information and a complete list
of enforcement actions filed in FY 2014).
110 See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Lawmakers Focus on How S.E.C. Does Its Job,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/31/
business/dealbook/lawmakers-focus-on-how-sec-does-its-job.html [https://
perma.cc/5MTQ-CHV4] (describing Congressional scrutiny of how the SEC en-
forces the securities laws).  The EPA’s activities may be scrutinized as closely.
111 See, e.g., Macey, supra note 8, at 652–54 (using one salient anecdote to R
criticize the SEC’s pursuit of firms instead of going after individuals).
112 See OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT NO. OIG-
509, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF’S PONZI
SCHEME 1–2 (2009).
113 See Jonathan Weil & John Wilke, Systemic Failure by SEC Is Seen in Enron
Debacle, WALL ST. J., (Oct. 7, 2002, 3:22 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB1033944629262271233 [https://perma.cc/2R4Z-YGVX].
114 See Oversight of the Security and Exchange Commission’s Failure to Identify
the Bernard L. Madoff Ponzi Scheme and How to Improve SEC Performance: Hear-
ing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 95–105
(2009) (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director, Division of Enforcement, Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission & John Walsh, Acting Director, Office of Compli-
ance Inspections & Examinations, Securities and Exchange Commission).
115 See, e.g., Jean Eaglesham, SEC Brings Fewer Enforcement Actions, Slows
Early-Stage Probes, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2013, 12:21 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052702304403804579264293892648268 [https://
perma.cc/R4BR-TV4Y] (reporting that the SEC brought fewer enforcement cases
during the post-financial crisis era).
116 See, e.g., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Commission Announces Enforcement
Results for FY 2013, SEC NEWS DIGEST, No. 2013-241 (Dec. 17, 2013), https://
www.sec.gov/news/digest/2013/dig121713.htm [http://perma.cc/NWC8-L64E]
(describing the Chair of the SEC’s pride in the agency’s enforcement efforts); Amir
Efrati & Tom McGinty, Youz Indictin’ Who? A Rivalry Grows for Stock Cops in
Brooklyn, Manhattan, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2008, at C1 (quoting SEC spokes-
man’s listing of the number of enforcement actions and penalties secured as
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SEC Chairs like to describe enforcement as the agency’s “num-
ber one priority”117 and the “bedrock warrant” for its continued
existence.118  Yet, despite intense public interest, SEC enforce-
ment remains understudied.119  Nearly all law review articles,
newspaper reports, and law firm client memoranda regarding
SEC enforcement rely exclusively on figures that the SEC
releases.120
This Part and Parts III and IV explain why and how these
figures are flawed.  This Part describes in more detail the SEC’s
evidence of aggressive enforcement); Bloomberg News, SEC Plans Tougher En-
forcement in ‘07, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Oct. 28, 2006) (reporting that the SEC was
planning to bring more enforcement actions in FY 2007).
117 UK and US “Differ on Enforcement,” DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON), Dec. 3,
2005, at 30 (quoting SEC Chair Christopher Cox); see also Katz, supra note 23, at R
509 (explaining that “virtually every Chairman of the SEC in the past thirty years”
believed that the SEC is primarily a law enforcement agency).
118 Bevis Longstreth, The SEC After Fifty Years: An Assessment of Its Past and
Future, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1593, 1612 (1983) (reviewing JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANS-
FORMATION OF WALL STREET—A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE (1982)).
119 See Simi Kedia & Shiva Rajgopal, Do the SEC’s Enforcement Preferences
Affect Corporate Misconduct?, 51 J. ACCT. & ECON. 259, 259 (2011) (observing that
there is little empirical work studying the overall effectiveness of SEC
enforcement).
120 See Barbara Black, How to Improve Retail Investor Protection After the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
59, 72 n.83  (2010) (using SEC data to report the share of enforcement actions
against broker-dealers and investment advisors); Bratton & Wachter, supra note
94, at 154–57 figs.4–7 (using the numbers in SEC Annual Reports to generate R
figures without making adjustments for follow-on and duplicative enforcement
actions); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Reassessing Damages in Securities Fraud
Class Actions, 66 MD. L. REV. 348, 397 (2007) (reporting SEC enforcement statis-
tics); Coffee, Jr., supra note 24, at 269 (comparing SEC enforcement actions with R
similar enforcement actions in the U.K. without adjusting the U.S. figures); Arthur
B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers, 55 VILL.
L. REV. 701, 709 n.46 (2010) (arguing that the SEC’s figures understate enforce-
ment against broker-dealers and investment advisers, without adjusting for fol-
low-on cases); Hillary A. Sale, Banks: The Forgotten(?) Partners in Fraud, 73 U.
CIN. L. REV. 139, 176–77 (2004) (using the SEC’s statistics to suggest that enforce-
ment activity increased between 2002 and 2003, when the increase is exclusively
due to follow-on and second cases brought–all already counted); Natalya Shnitser,
A Free Pass for Foreign Firms? An Assessment of SEC and Private Enforcement
Against Foreign Issuers, 119 YALE L.J. 1638, 1667 tbl.3 (2010) (reporting figures
from SEC’s annual reports); Sonia A. Steinway, Comment, SEC “Monetary Penal-
ties Speak Very Loudly,” But What Do They Say? A Critical Analysis of the SEC’s
New Enforcement Approach, 124 YALE L.J. 209, 211 fig.1 (2014) (using numbers
from the SEC’s annual reports without adjusting them).
By contrast, financial economists ordinarily report their own hand-coded re-
sults, not the SEC’s figures, though such studies a very rare. See, e.g., Jonathan
Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books,
43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581, 588–89 (2008) (using hand-coded results
to calculate the number of SEC investigations in a given period of time) [hereinaf-
ter Karpoff, Lee & Martin, The Cost to Firms].
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annual reporting practices, describes the data, and presents
the study methodology.
A. Annual Performance Reports
The SEC has released an annual report every year since
1935, and has included detailed information on each enforce-
ment action brought.121  As the SEC’s enforcement powers ex-
panded, so did reporting on enforcement.  Since 1987, the
Commission has reported its enforcement in the same manner
as it does today, with some minor methodological modifica-
tions.122  The enforcement report begins with a table aggregat-
ing enforcement actions by subject-matter and by venue in
which they are brought, followed by a list of all enforcement
actions organized by subject-matter and date filed.123  In the
years since 1987, the SEC has stopped reporting on case out-
comes,124 and after the Results Act, it switched to performance
indicators,125 which in various ways are less meaningful than
enforcement statistics reported decades ago.126  Fortunately
and usefully, the SEC has continued to provide a list of all filed
enforcement actions during the fiscal year and a summary ta-
ble of enforcement [as shown in Table 1].  The Commission
uses that same raw data not only to report aggregate numbers
but also to generate other performance indicators that it re-
ports to Congress.
121 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION: FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1936, at 48–50, 54–57 (1936).
122 Compare U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 53RD ANNUAL REPORT 144–51 (1987),
with SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2008 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 26–34
(2008).
123 See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 53RD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 122, R
at 144–51 (listing the enforcement actions brought in FY 1987).
124 For example, the FY 1987 annual report includes statistics on the number
and the outcomes in litigated cases before federal appellate courts and the Su-
preme Court. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 53RD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 122, R
at 56.
125 FY 2003 was last annual report to include a complete list of filed enforce-
ment actions. Compare U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2003, at
104–23 (2004) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 2003], with U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
2004 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 57–60 (2005) [hereinafter 2004 PER-
FORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT].
126 See infra Part IV.B.
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TABLE 1: SAMPLE SEC ENFORCEMENT REPORT
Enforcement Action Summary Chart for Fiscal 2014 by Primary Classifica-
tion (Each action initiated has been included in only one category listed
below, even though many actions involved multiple allegations and may fall








Total % of 
Actions 
Broker-Dealer 7 (10) 159 (179) 166 (189) 22% 
Delinquent Filing 0 (0) 110 (453) 110 (453) 15% 
Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act 
3 (3) 4 (4) 7 (7) 1% 





10 (34) 120 (171) 130 (205) 17% 
Issuer Reporting 
and Disclosure 
12 (28) 84 (117) 96 (145) 13% 
Market 
Manipulation 
17 (57) 46 (51) 63 (108) 8% 
Miscellaneous 0 (0) 37 (40) 37 (40) 5% 
Municipal 
Securities & Public 
Pensions 
2 (4) 4 (8) 6 (12) 1% 
Securities Offering 52 (261) 29 (42) 81 (303) 11% 
Transfer Agent 2 (4) 5 (7) 7 (11) 1% 
TOTALS 145 (476) 610 (1085) 755 (1561) 100% 
As shown below in Figure 1, the SEC’s annual enforcement
statistics show a trend that is, more or less, continuously in-
creasing: each fiscal year, the SEC reports that it filed more
enforcement actions than the previous year, against more de-
fendants, ordering them to pay larger monetary penalties.127
127 The considerable decline in monetary penalties imposed in 2007 and 2008
was entirely the product of Chair Christopher Cox’s change in enforcement policy.
In 2006, only a few months after Chair Cox took over, the Commission articulated
a set of criteria for imposing a monetary penalty against the firm.  The goal of the
guideline was to reduce corporate penalties: it limited monetary penalties to cases
where the firm received a “direct and material benefit” and against penalties if
they would cause additional harm to shareholders who did not violate securities
laws. See Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning Fi-
nancial Penalties, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Jan. 4, 2006), https://
www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm [http://perma.cc/J5YQ-LUSA].
In addition, the Commission required enforcement staff to show tangible ben-
efits to the company using an event study and to seek pre-approval of the penalty
range before beginning settlement discussions. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability
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The brief decline in monetary penalties between 2006 and 2008
during Republican SEC Chair Christopher Cox’s administra-
tion128 was quickly reversed in fiscal year 2009, as Chair Cox
stepped down, and the Madoff Ponzi scheme and the financial
crisis spurred the Commission to change its approach.
















































No. of Enforcement Actions Aggregate penalties (in 2014 $)
In Part III, the Article discusses in considerable detail why
the indicators that the SEC uses do not validly and reliably
measure the SEC’s enforcement output.  The following section,
however, explains how the data was collected and what meth-
odology was used to analyze the data.
Office, supra note 35, at 33; Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. R
Comm’n, Address to the Mutual Fund Directors Forum Seventh Annual Policy
Conference (Apr. 13, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch0412
07cc.htm [http://perma.cc/9LM8-M7TJ] (“So in a handful of cases where the
need for national consistency is greatest, we’re reviving what had been a long
standing policy of the SEC for all cases for many years—that Commission ap-
proval be obtained before settlement discussions are commenced.”).  The “handful
of cases” involved all cases where a corporate penalty was sought.
128 That is, between October 1, 2006 and September 30, 2008.
129 Source: SEC annual reports and Select SEC and Market Data reports. See
Reports, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/
about/secreports.shtml [https://perma.cc/RX2J-G3EU].
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B. Data and Methodology
The SEC begins an investigation into possible securities
violations by opening a matter under inquiry.130  If it finds
evidence of misconduct, the Commission opens first an infor-
mal investigation,131 then a formal investigation,132 and ulti-
mately files an enforcement action.133  Investigations vary
considerably in size and complexity. An investigation into ac-
counting fraud or a pyramid scheme usually includes multiple
entities and individuals.134  Although investigations come in
many shapes and sizes, each investigation is related to a spe-
cific and unique set of underlying facts.  An enforcement ac-
tion, on the other hand, is a legal proceeding that the SEC
initiates by filing a civil complaint in district court or an order
instituting proceedings before an administrative law judge
(“ALJ”) against a specific firm or firms and/or individuals based
on the facts uncovered during the investigation.135  The SEC
files an enforcement action after completing an investigation,
on average some twenty-one to twenty-two months after open-
ing an informal investigation.136
The SEC often initiates multiple legal proceedings, i.e., en-
forcement actions, on the basis of a single investigation.137  In
130 See DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL
12 (2015).
131 See id. at 16.
132 See id. at 17.
133 See id. at 22.
134 See SEC Charges 38 in Multi-Million Dollar Stock Loan Scams, U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Sept. 20, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/
2007-192.htm [http://perma.cc/JU2L-2KWV].
135 See How Investigations Work, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (May 24,
2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/Article/Detail/Article/1356125787012 [http:/
/perma.cc/FU2F-6VR4].
136 SEC, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 70, at 40. R
137 See Karpoff, Lee & Martin, The Cost to Firms, supra note 120, at 588, 589 R
tbl.3 (reporting that between 1978 and 2006, each successful investigation into
accounting fraud resulted on average in 1.70 administrative enforcement actions,
2.06 civil actions and 0.56 criminal actions).  Karpoff and his collaborators con-
fusingly label investigations that lead to the initiation of legal proceedings “en-
forcement actions” and the legal proceedings as “regulatory events.” Id. at 589
tbl.3; see also Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Conse-
quences to Managers for Financial Misrepresentation, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 193, 197
(2008) [hereinafter Karpoff, Lee & Martin, The Consequences to Managers] (refer-
ring to investigations that result in some form of enforcement as “enforcement
actions” and to enforcement actions as “proceedings”).  In SEC parlance, an en-
forcement action is a term of art referring to each initiated legal proceeding.
Investigations that lead to legal proceedings are usually described as that, investi-
gations, or cases.  The legal literature uses the term enforcement action consis-
tent with the SEC’s usage. See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit
Public Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REV. 853, 896 (2014) (referring to enforcement
actions by private litigants, which are by definition legal proceedings).
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the largest investigations the Commission initiates a dozen or
more separate legal proceedings against various players.  Fol-
lowing an investigation into accounting fraud at Adelphia, for
example, the SEC brought an enforcement action in court
seeking penalties and injunctions against the firm and its top
officers,138 a civil action against Adelphia’s supplier Scientific-
Atlanta for aiding and abetting Adelphia’s fraud,139 two admin-
istrative actions against Scientific-Atlanta’s insiders,140 an ad-
ministrative action against Adelphia’s auditor Deloitte &
Touche,141 and another against the engagement partner in
charge of the Adelphia audit.142  Investigations or cases143 like
Adelphia can continue to spawn enforcement actions for sev-
eral years.144
138 Complaint at 6, SEC v. Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., No. 1:02-cv-5776
(S.D.N.Y. Jul. 24, 2002).
139 Complaint at 3, SEC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., No. 1:06-cv-4823 (PKC)
(S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2006).
140 Wallace G. Haislip, Exchange Act Release No. 54,030, 88 SEC Docket 779
(June 22, 2006); Julian W. Eidson, Exchange Act Release No. 54,031, 88 SEC
Docket 782 (June 22, 2006).
141 Deloitte & Touche LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 51,606, 85 SEC Docket
841 (Apr. 26, 2005).
142 Initial Decision, Gregory M. Dearlove, Initial Decision Release No. 315, 88
SEC Docket 1603 (ALJ July 27, 2006).
143 The SEC, too, refers to investigations as “cases”. See New Charges in
Insider Trading Case Include Former CEO and Professional Baseball Player, Liti-
gation Release No. 22,451, 104 SEC Docket 1896 (Aug. 17, 2012), https://
www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2012/lr22451.htm [https://perma.cc/C7JD-
M4W3].
144 In 2007, the SEC completed an investigation in stock loan scams.  It
brought two civil actions in court against 38 individual defendants. See SEC
Charges 38 in Multi-Million Dollar Stock Loan Scams, supra note 134.  In 2011, it R
brought more than a dozen follow-on actions against the same defendants. See,
e.g., Craig Demizio, Exchange Act Release No. 63,921, 100 SEC Docket 1635 (Feb.
17, 2011); Darin Demizio, Exchange Act Release No. 63,922, 100 SEC Docket
1635 (Feb. 17, 2011); Shaun Sarnicola, Exchange Act Release No. 63,924, 100
SEC Docket 1637 (Feb. 17, 2011).
This is not a new phenomenon.  In 2000, the investigation into the Capital
Consultants LLC Ponzi scheme resulted in four enforcement actions: a civil action
seeking monetary fines and injunctions, and three administrative cases seeking
disbarments. See Complaint for Federal Securities Law Violations, SEC v. Capital
Consultants LLC, 2000 WL 35449178 (D. Or. Sept. 21, 2000) (3:00-cv-01290-KI)
(civil action); Capital Consultants LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No.
1,963, 75 SEC Docket 1451 (Aug. 10, 2001); Jeffrey L. Grayson, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 1,964 (Aug. 10, 2001); Barclay L. Grayson, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 1,962, 75 SEC Docket 1450 (Aug. 10, 2001).  In 2002,
the SEC investigated Chimneyville Investments Group Inc. and its owner.  It filed
three enforcement actions: one civil action against the firm and the owner, and
two administrative actions seeking permanent bars against each.  Complaint,
SEC v. Chimneyville Inv. Grp. Inc., 3:98-cv-00574-HTW (S.D. Miss. Sept. 1, 1998)
(civil action); Chimneyville Inv. Grp. Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 46,424, 78
SEC Docket 958 (Aug. 28, 2002); Joseph Randolph Belew, Exchange Act Release
No. 46,687, 2002 WL 31356634 (Oct. 21, 2002).
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The SEC collects information on its enforcement activities
and presents it annually, usually in the late fall, soon after the
end of the fiscal year.145  The SEC does not report the number
of matters under investigation.  It reports the number of infor-
mal investigations opened and the number of formal orders of
investigation issued during any fiscal year.146  But the SEC
features most prominently enforcement actions it files.  The
annually-released reports list all enforcement actions filed dur-
ing the fiscal year and tabulate the data by the primary cate-
gory by subject-matter and venue.147  This report used to be
included in the annual report as an appendix.148  Since 2004,
the SEC has included some aggregate statistics in the annual
report,149 but the annual report no longer includes detailed
information about enforcement.  The SEC has continued to re-
lease such information in a separate document, entitled Select
SEC and Market Data, that it makes available on its website,150
and has continued to feature prominently enforcement statis-
tics discussed in this Article.151
In order to analyze the SEC’s reporting conventions, I re-
viewed 9,679 filed enforcement actions that are listed in the
SEC’s reports released from 2000 to 2014 (inclusive).  The
search uncovered some inconsistencies.  The tables and figures
reproduced in this Article report accurate figures.  The SEC
listed and counted twice a handful of enforcement actions.152
The report for 2004 is missing pages153 and so I supplemented
the list by reviewing the SEC’s litigation releases.  In the 2005
report, Delinquent Filing enforcement actions are recorded in
the wrong column (as civil actions), yielding a tally of civil ac-
tions that is too high by sixty, and a tally of administrative
145 See U.S. SEC & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 4, at 2. R
146 See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA FISCAL
2013, at 19 tbl.4 (2015) (reporting the number of investigations opened and
formal orders issued during FY 2013).
147 See id. at 3–18.
148 See ANNUAL REPORT 2003, supra note 125, at 103–23 tbls.1–2. R
149 E.g., 2004 Performance and Accountability Report, supra note 125, at R
21–25 (discussing enforcement cases instituted and successfully resolved).
150 E.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 146 (the 2013 version of this R
report).
151 See Reports, supra note 129 (linking to annual compilations of enforcement R
data from 2004–2014).
152 See infra section III.A.3.
153 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SELECT SEC AND MARKET FISCAL DATA 2004,
at 20.  The report finishes its list of offering violations in March of 2004, omitting
six months of that type of case.
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proceedings that is too low by sixty.154  In addition, the defen-
dant count reported in the 2005 report is too high by forty
defendants, primarily in the broker-dealer and investment ad-
viser categories.155  Because the total number of enforcement
actions reported is consistent with the enforcement actions I
reviewed, I suspect the SEC’s reported defendant count for
2005 must be in error.  The tables and figures reproduced in
this Article correct for these errors.
The SEC’s enforcement budget as well as maximum finan-
cial penalties increased considerably in 2002 after accounting
scandals and the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.156  I re-
viewed two years of enforcement actions before the adoption of
the Act to see whether there are any obvious differences in
reporting conventions used before and after—and there are
none.157
The SEC reports as an “enforcement action” a legal pro-
ceeding initiated in district court or before the ALJ against one
or more defendants.  The SEC does not include all legal pro-
ceedings as enforcement actions.  For example, reinstatements
after a bar or suspension are not listed as enforcement ac-
tions.158  In some years, the Commission does not count de-
ferred prosecution agreements as enforcement actions, while in
others it does.159
I coded enforcement actions as follows: (1) primary enforce-
ment action seeking monetary penalties, injunctions, and
cease-and-desist orders; (2) follow-on action brought under
Section 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act160 or Rule 102(e)
of the SEC’s Rules of Practice161 brought after the conclusion of
154 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SELECT SEC AND MARKET FISCAL DATA 2005,
at 3.
155 Id.
156 See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat.
745 (2002).
157 In fiscal years 2000 and 2001, the SEC brought fewer enforcement actions
and fewer follow-on proceedings than in the later years. See infra Tables 3B & 3C.
The relative share of follow-on proceedings was not appreciably different.
158 See, e.g., Jordan H. Mintz, Exchange Act Release No. 65,012, 101 SEC
Docket 2852 (Aug. 2, 2011) (permitting Mr. Mintz to resume practice before the
commission after a two year ban.  The case was not listed in the SEC’s 2011
report).
159 Compare Tenaris to Pay $5.4 Million in SEC’s First-Ever Deferred Prosecu-
tion Agreement, Release No. 11-112, 2011 WL 1851249 (May 17, 2011) (listed in
2011 Fiscal Year report), with SEC Announces First Deferred Prosecution Agree-
ment With Individual, Release No. 13-241, 2013 WL 5979519 (Nov. 12, 2013) (not
listed in 2014 FY report).
160 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (2012).
161 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2015).
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the primary enforcement action (and based on it) seeking to bar
the defendant from appearing before the Commission as audi-
tor or attorney, to bar the defendant from working in the secur-
ities industry, or to impose a penny stock bar; or (3) secondary
enforcement action where the SEC, based on the same set of
facts against the same defendant, filed simultaneously two en-
forcement actions: a civil action seeking a fine and an adminis-
trative action seeking a cease-and-desist order.  In such cases,
I coded the civil action as a primary enforcement action and the
administrative proceeding seeking a cease-and-desist order as
a secondary enforcement action.  The raw data on enforcement
actions are reported in Tables 3A, 3B, and 3C in the Appendix.
The SEC often brings an enforcement action alongside
other enforcement agencies, including the DOJ,162 the
CFTC,163 NASD or FINRA,164 the PCAOB,165 the exchanges,166
or a state securities agency.167  I coded such enforcement ac-
tions as primary if the SEC sought monetary penalties, injunc-
tions, cease-and-desist orders, or censure.  Enforcement
actions where the SEC sought to disbar or suspend a defen-
dant based on an earlier enforcement action by another agency
targeting the same defendant for the same misconduct were
coded as follow-on actions.  I coded as two separate primary
162 See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S. v. Statoil, ASA, 1:06-cr-
960 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2006), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
cases/statoil-asa-inc/10-09-06statoil-agree.pdf [https://perma.cc/87RH-3E2K]
(DOJ proceeding); Statoil, ASA, Exchange Act Release No. 54,599, 89 SEC Docket
283 (Oct. 13, 2006), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2006/34-54599.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6GUG-AV8K] (related SEC proceeding).
163 See, e.g., SEC v. Sunstate FX Inc., Litigation Release No. 16,981, 2001 WL
456371 (May 1, 2001), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr16981.htm
[https://perma.cc/L23W-PA7W] (announcing complaint filed simultaneously
with CFTC).
164 See, e.g., First Command Financial Planning, Inc., Securities Act Release
No. 8,513, Exchange Act Release No. 50,859, 84 SEC Docket 1332, at 7–9 (Dec.
15, 2004) (imposing compliance provisions with NASD supervision); Knight Se-
curities L.P., Exchange Act Release No. 50,867, 84 SEC Docket 1417, at 8 (Dec.
16, 2004) (nothing that the respondent previously settled with the NASD); SEC
Charges Goldman, Sachs & Co. Lacked Adequate Policies and Procedures for Re-
search ”Huddles,” U.S. SEC & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Apr. 12, 2012), http://
www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171488258 [http://
perma.cc/M4RW-34SH] (reporting that the respondent settled with FINRA the
same day it settled with the SEC).
165 See infra notes 275–276. R
166 See, e.g., Van Der Moolen Specialists USA, LLC, Exchange Act Release No.
49,502, 83 SEC Docket 2366, at 14 n.11 (Mar. 30, 2004) (noting that the penalties
paid also satisfy damages ordered in a related proceeding instituted by the New
York Stock Exchange).
167 See, e.g., Deutsche Asset Management, Investment Company Act Release
No. 27,606, 89 SEC Docket 1887, at 14 (Dec. 21, 2006) (simultaneous NY and
SEC proceeding).
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enforcement actions where the SEC sanctioned in separate ac-
tions the firm, its owners,168 or executives.169  Bringing an en-
forcement action against a firm is usually considerably easier
than bringing one against individuals.  Individuals tend to fight
charges, in particular those that give rise to temporary or per-
manent suspensions or bars from the industry, whereas the
firm generally settles for financial penalties or less.170  Simi-
larly, I coded the actions for accounting fraud against the is-
suer and its external auditor as two primary enforcement
actions.171  Auditors are not ordinarily charged when a firm
misrepresents its financials,172 and so charging an auditor re-
quires additional resources and expertise on the part of the
SEC.
I coded as primary enforcement actions where the SEC was
the first to bring an enforcement action that was later followed
by a conviction.173  In many cases the SEC coordinates its in-
vestigation with the DOJ.  In criminal matters, either the DOJ
usually moves first,174 or the SEC and the DOJ announce a
168 I used the same terminology as the SEC. See supra note 137. R
169 See, e.g., SEC Charges CVS With Misleading Investors and Committing
Accounting Violations, Litigation Release No. 22,968, 2014 WL 1365924 (Apr. 8,
2014), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2014/lr22968.htm [https://
perma.cc/SUS2-6MPP] (charging CVS Caremark managers with making improper
accounting adjustments).
170 Compare, e.g., SEC Charges Diebold and Former Financial Executives
With Accounting Fraud, Litigation Release No. 21,543, 2010 WL 2194786 (June
2, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21543.htm [https:/
/perma.cc/5PG6-MJY8] (announcing settlement with $25 million civil penalty
against corporation), with SEC v. Geswein, 2 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1077–78 (N.D.
Ohio 2014) (denying the corporation’s officers’ motion to dismiss charges arising
from the same violation).
171 See, e.g., Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 1–4, SEC v. Yuhe Int’l, Inc.,
2013 WL 5669183 (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 2013) (1:13-cv-1598) (charge of accounting
fraud against primary issuer); Child, Van Wagoner & Bradshaw PLLC, Exchange
Act Release No. 72,557, 109 SEC Docket 1355, at 1–3 (July 8, 2014) (charge of
accounting fraud against auditor).
172 See Simi Kedia, Urooj Khan & Shiva Rajgopal, The SEC’s Enforcement
Record Against Auditors 14 (Aug. 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://
www8.gsb.columbia.edu/researcharchives/articles/13983 [https://perma.cc/
65Y5-9CC4] (finding that from 1996 to 2009, the SEC charged the auditor who
signed off on a fraudulent financial statement in only 17% of accounting fraud
enforcement actions).
173 See, e.g., Hector Gallardo, Exchange Act Release No. 65,422, 102 SEC
Docket 81 (Sept. 28, 2011) (SEC’s initial charge against stock broker); Stock
Broker Arrested on Wire Fraud Charges, OFFICE U.S. ATT’Y (Nov. 3, 2011), https://
www.justice.gov/archive/usao/nye/pr/2011/2011nov03.html [http://
perma.cc/G4WN-U52U] (criminal charges following SEC’s initial action).
174 See SEC Charges Operators of Fraud Based in Upstate New York, U.S. SEC.
& EXCHANGE COMMISSION (July 30, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/press-
release/2015-156.html [https://perma.cc/VTB6-PT2F] (announcing civil charges
against defendant whom the DOJ arrested a week earlier).
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coordinated settlement simultaneously.175  Rarely, the SEC
moves first.  In those cases, if the DOJ ultimately decides to
move forward, it routinely moves to intervene in the ongoing
SEC proceeding and requests a stay,176 which is ordinarily
granted.  If the defendant is convicted, the SEC’s original pri-
mary enforcement action is effectively converted into a follow-
on proceeding, in which the defendant is disbarred or sus-
pended but not otherwise sanctioned.177  Such cases are rare
and were coded as primary enforcement actions.
Further complicating the analysis are changes in SEC re-
porting during the study period.  Fortunately, the Commission
did not change the definition of an enforcement action but has
changed subject-matter categorizations several times during
the study period.  It used to break out enforcement actions
against broker-dealers into four or five categories.178  Recently,
it has reported all enforcement actions for broker-dealer viola-
tions in a single category, except for enforcement actions for
municipal securities violations that have been reported sepa-
rately since 2005, and are no longer included in the overall
broker-dealer tally.179  As a result, the numbers of enforcement
actions against broker-dealers before and after 2005 are not
directly comparable.  Similarly, until fiscal year 2011 the Com-
mission reported enforcement actions brought under the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) as Issuer Reporting and
Disclosure actions.180  Since then, FCPA cases have been re-
ported separately.181  As a result, the reported numbers on
enforcement actions and defendants in Issuer Reporting and
Disclosure actions before and after 2011 are not directly com-
parable.  Finally, until fiscal year 2013 the SEC used to report
contempt proceedings—actions to enforce compliance with an
175 See SEC Charges Avon with FCPA Violations, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COM-
MISSION (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2014-285.html
[https://perma.cc/U3MK-X64Z] (announcing simultaneous settlement of SEC
charges and parallel DOJ criminal charges).
176 See, e.g., David M. Tamman, Exchange Act Release No. 69,746, 106 SEC
Docket 2314, at 1 (ALJ June 12, 2013) (Administrative Law Judge granted stay in
proceedings pending resolution of a criminal indictment against the defendant).
177 See id. at 1–2 (granting summary disposition of matter and imposing per-
manent disqualification of the defendant from practicing before the SEC after he
was convicted of ten felony counts in criminal proceedings).
178 E.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 145–46 (2002) (cate-
gorizing broker-dealer cases as “Books & Records,” “Fraud Against Customer,”
“Government/Municipal Securities,” and “Other”).
179 E.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SELECT SEC & MARKET DATA FISCAL 2006, at
4–6.
180 E.g., id. at 12–15.
181 E.g., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 146, at 9. R
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earlier enforcement action—in its aggregate tally of enforce-
ment actions filed, but no longer does so.182  As a result, pre-
2013 totals are inflated by the number of filed contempt pro-
ceedings compared with fiscal years 2013 and later.
III
PROBLEMS WITH SEC REPORTING
This Part identifies the most serious problems with the
SEC’s enforcement statistics that the SEC uses to communi-
cate that it is a vigorous enforcer of securities laws.  The most
important and most commonly used metric to report on the
SEC’s enforcement effort is the number of enforcement actions
initiated during a fiscal year either by filing a complaint or an
order instituting proceedings.183  Yet counting enforcement ac-
tions yields an invalid and unreliable proxy for enforcement
activity: it double- and triple-counts some cases, lumps to-
gether investigations with technical revocation proceedings, is
inconsistent from year to year, and can be manipulated with-
out much difficulty.184  Other enforcement statistics that the
SEC reports, including defendant count, subject-matter cate-
gorization, and monetary penalties, are similarly problematic.
This Part identifies problems with the validity and the relia-
bility of the statistics that the SEC uses to measure its enforce-
ment output.  Then, by using recent examples, Part IV
demonstrates the most significant consequences of using inva-
lid and unreliable statistics to report on and analyze securities
enforcement.
A. Problem 1: Validity
In statistics, the validity of a variable—the proxy used to
measure an activity or a condition of interest—is the degree to
which it measures what it is supposed to measure.185
There are various ways to evaluate securities enforcement.
Generally speaking, enforcement statistics can and have been
used as both a measure of input (in studies of deterrence) and
as a measure of output (in reports about the resources directed
182 Id. at 3 n.1; see also discussion infra in Part III.A.2.
183 See supra Part II.B.
184 The enforcement staff believe that gross tallies present an incomplete view
of enforcement activity and are “vulnerable to manipulation.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNT-
ABILITY OFFICE, supra note 35, at 22. R
185 See EDWARD G. CARMINES & RICHARD A. ZELLER, RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY AS-
SESSMENT 11–13 (1979) (Sage Univ. Paper Series on Quantitative Applications in
the Soc. Scis. No. 07-017) (discussing reliability and validity).
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at policing securities markets).186  In order to conduct either
type of analysis using statistical methods, one would want to
know how many investigations an agency has initiated, against
how many securities violators, and for what sorts of violations.
For example, in deterrence studies, one would want to get a
handle on the number of enforcement defendants targeted and
another variable to measure the type and significance of the
actions.  One could then compare these figures with estimates
of underlying misconduct to get a sense of the intensity of
enforcement and to have a way to measure whether sanctions
are having the desired deterrent effect.  One would expect the
number and the significance of new cases to vary over time,
depending on the rate of misconduct, the available resources
for the enforcement agency, and the agency’s effective use of
those resources.  In output studies, one would want to catego-
rize the data by the seriousness of the alleged charges and by
the various market segments that enforcement actions purport
to regulate.
The most prominently reported statistics about SEC en-
forcement—the number of enforcement actions filed and the
number of monetary penalties ordered—are not useful for any
of the purposes identified in the paragraph above.187  They do
not validly measure enforcement activity as conventionally un-
derstood: the likelihood of enforcement and the severity of the
sanctions, or how well the SEC is meeting its goals.  Other
statistics that the SEC also reports, including the number of
defendants targeted, could mitigate the problems associated
with counting enforcement actions if they did not suffer from
similar defects.  The following sections explain in more detail
why the SEC’s enforcement statistics are invalid.
1. Counting Enforcement Actions
Each year, the SEC reports the number of investigations
opened, the number of formal orders of investigation secured,
and the number of enforcement actions filed.  But it is the
number of enforcement actions filed, which implies a success-
186 I do not want to suggest these are the only purposes for which enforcement
statistics can be used.  They can be useful not only for Congressional oversight
and academic research, they can also be useful to the SEC in montitoring internal
management processes and in managing public relations, and generally to study
the relationships between the various parties in the regulatory process.
187 See Macey, supra note 8, at 646 (“The more cases that are brought and the R
greater the amount of fines collected during a particular time frame, the better the
enforcement staff at the SEC is thought to perform.”).
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ful investigation, that is featured most prominently.188  Five
factors make enforcement actions problematic as a measure of
enforcement activity.  First, the three statistics that the SEC
reports on the number of investigated cases—informal investi-
gations, formal orders of investigation, and enforcement ac-
tions—are not comparable.  An investigation can generate
multiple enforcement actions but not every investigation will
generate at least one.  Nowhere in its annual reports does the
SEC explain and report how many investigations yielded at
least one enforcement action.  As a result, it is not clear how
many investigations are ultimately closed without legal action,
or whether and why investigations hit stumbling blocks before
they become enforcement actions, and it is not obvious that the
SEC does either.189
Second, counting enforcement actions may be a straight-
forward and convenient way for enforcement staff to keep track
of various ongoing proceedings but it is a poor proxy for the
likelihood of enforcement and for measuring enforcement out-
put.  The reason is that the SEC sometimes joins several de-
fendants in a single enforcement action and at other times sues
them individually.190  The SEC’s practices of filing separate or
consolidated actions are not consistent over time and even be-
tween regional offices.191  As a result, the number of enforce-
ment actions will vary from year to year for reasons unrelated
to underlying misconduct or the intensity of enforcement.
Third, as explained above,192 an enforcement action is a
legal proceeding initiated by a complaint or an order instituting
proceedings, and identified by a docket number.  Many of the
SEC’s enforcement actions are lawsuits in district court or ad-
ministrative actions seeking to establish that the defendant
violated securities laws, and to impose sanctions for violations,
including monetary penalties, injunctions, and cease-and-de-
sist orders.193  In this Article, I dub these primary enforcement
188 The SEC reports the number of investigations and formal investigations
initiated during each fiscal year, but does not report how many formal investiga-
tions result in enforcement actions. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra
note 109, at 21. R
189 Cf. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 35, at 3–8; see also SEC v. R
Caledonian Bank Ltd., 2015 WL 6971535, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2015) (expres-
sing surprise that that the SEC does not have systems in place to track investiga-
tions and enforcement actions to prevent duplicative filings).
190 Cf. Coffee, Jr., supra note 24, at 270 (noting that the SEC “typically pur- R
sues multiple individuals in each enforcement action”).
191 See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
192 Supra Part II.B.
193 Id.
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actions.194  In addition, the SEC files so-called follow-on en-
forcement actions in administrative proceedings seeking to im-
pose a partial or full associational bar against an offender, to
suspend or to revoke registration as broker-dealer or invest-
ment adviser, or to suspend the right of an auditor or attorney
to practice before the Commission.195  All follow-on actions are
derivative: they are ordinarily based on an injunction that the
SEC imposed in a primary enforcement action against the
same offender based on the same set of facts.  In all follow-on
proceedings, either the defendant already settled an SEC en-
forcement action (or lost in court or before the administrative
law judge), was convicted, or was sanctioned by another federal
agency or state securities regulator.196  None of the follow-on
actions are new enforcement actions and all have already been
counted at least once in the SEC’s enforcement tally, or that of
another agency.197  Most have been counted twice, often in the
same fiscal year.  Some have been counted three or more
times.198
194 In a recent press release, the SEC referred to such proceedings as “inde-
pendent enforcement actions.” SEC Announces Enforcement Results for FY 2015,
U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/
pressrelease/2015-245.html [https://perma.cc/Q4V6-CCMW].
195 DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, supra note 130, at 25. R
196 See id.
197 A large majority of follow-on cases are triggered and/or accompanied by a
primary SEC enforcement action.  Only a handful of follow-on cases are based on
a prior criminal conviction or bar imposed by state securities regulators, without
an accompanying SEC primary enforcement action.  For example, in fiscal 2009,
the SEC brought 146 follow-on enforcement actions and 7 secondary enforcement
actions seeking cease-and-desist orders.  Of those, only eleven (7%) were not
accompanied by a primary SEC enforcement action against the same defendant
for the same violation, and thus not already counted at least once in the SEC
enforcement tally.  In 2010, the SEC brought 223 follow-on enforcement actions
and 12 secondary enforcement actions seeking cease-and-desist orders.  Of those,
only thirteen (6%) were not accompanied by a primary SEC enforcement action
against the same defendant for the same violation.  In 2011, 16 of 239 (7%) follow-
on and secondary actions were not accompanied by a primary SEC enforcement
action; in 2012, 26 of 231 (11%) follow-on and secondary actions were not accom-
panied by a primary SEC enforcement action; in 2013, 23 of 204 (11%) follow-on
and secondary actions were not accompanied by a primary SEC enforcement
action.
In fiscal 2014, the number of follow-on cases not accompanied by a primary
SEC enforcement action increased considerably.  Of 246 follow-on enforcement
actions, 81 (33%) were not previously included in the SEC enforcement tally: 73
follow-on enforcement actions were triggered by criminal convictions without an
accompanying primary SEC enforcement actions and 8 follow-on enforcement
actions were triggered by actions of the CFTC or state banking and securities
regulators.  The best explanation for the uptick is that the enforcement division
directed staff to scour criminal records to find defendants to disbar.
198 In FY 2013 alone, the SEC brought three separate enforcement actions for
the same violation against James S. Quay and two follow-on cases against Ken-
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For example, in May 2013, the SEC brought a civil action
against Robert A. Gist for operating as a broker-dealer without
registration, and for defrauding his customers of at least $5.4
million.199  Shortly thereafter, and based on the same investi-
gation, the SEC filed two separate follow-on enforcement ac-
tions against Gist, one imposing a full associational bar and
another suspending him from appearing or practicing before
the Commission as attorney.200  All three enforcement actions
were included in the fiscal 2013 tally.201  The contribution of
follow-on cases to the overall enforcement tally is not trivial:
each year since 2002, the SEC has filed between 148 and 246
follow-on enforcement actions,202 boosting the overall number
of enforcement actions by between 23% and 34%.  Like con-
tempt proceedings,203 follow-on actions that prevent rogue bro-
kers and investment advisers from working in the securities
industry are important and should be reported, but sepa-
rately.204  It is misleading to include follow-on actions in a sta-
tistic that purports to measure new enforcement activity.205
Fourth, the SEC brings enforcement actions in district
court and before in-house administrative law judges.  In many
neth Ira Starr, whom the SEC first sued for the violation in 2010. See SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 109, at 4, 11, 16. R
199 SEC Charges Atlanta Attorney with Converting Investor Funds, U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (May 31, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/li-
treleases/2013/lr22710.htm [https://perma.cc/GQB7-MDP3].
200 Robert A. Gist, Exchange Act Release No. 70,243, 106 SEC Docket 4900
(Aug. 21, 2013) (suspending Gist); Robert A. Gist, Exchange Act Release No.
69,729, 106 SEC Docket 2274 (June 11, 2013) (imposing associational bar).
201 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 146, at 5, 6, 17. R
202 Infra Table 3C.
203 See discussion supra note 182. R
204 About a month after this study was circulated, the SEC released its en-
forcement report for fiscal year 2015.  In it, it reported follow-on actions sepa-
rately, as proposed in this Article. See SEC Announces Enforcement Results for FY
2015, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/
news/pressrelease/2015-245.html [https://perma.cc/C44X-ERZZ].  In February
2016, in response to a draft of this Article that was circulated in September 2015,
the SEC released the Select SEC and Market Data Report Fiscal 2015 and catego-
rized each action as civil action, stand-alone administrative action, and follow-on
action, as proposed in this Article. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SELECT SEC AND
MARKET DATA FISCAL 2015 (2016).
205 A handful of convictions listed as a reason for the permanent bar imposed
in fiscal year 2014 were entered much earlier. See, e.g., Christopher B. Mintz,
Exchange Act Release No. 72,353, at 2 (June 9, 2014) (imposing a permanent bar
based on 2009 guilty pleas of fraud by an investment adviser).  It is admirable for
the SEC to keep up with convicted criminals.  It also shows just how silly it is to
measure the performance of the SEC’s enforcement division by counting how
many legal proceedings it initiated in a given year.
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cases, the agency can choose the forum.206  But not always: the
SEC can seek a cease-and-desist order only in an administra-
tive proceeding and an injunction in district court only;207 it
can obtain an asset freeze in district court only,208 and can sue
a broker-dealer for failing to supervise an employee in an ad-
ministrative proceeding only.209  As a result, the SEC must
sometimes bring two enforcement actions against the same
defendant for the same violation to obtain the full relief it seeks,
one in district court and one before the ALJ.210  The remedies
the SEC seeks in different fora are important yet, as is true for
follow-on cases, that alone does not imply that both actions
should be included in an indicator of the number of new prose-
cutions.  Whether one or two actions are filed is a product of
convoluted legal rules, and not of more or less vigorous en-
forcement, nor does it result in a greater sanction for the defen-
dant.211  Secondary enforcement actions—filed simultaneously
against the same defendant for the same misconduct in court
and before the ALJ—are rarer than follow-on enforcement ac-
tions.  While complete coding remains to be done, in select
years between 2000 and 2014, the SEC brought between two
206 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 929P, 124 Stat. 1376, 1862–65 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77h-
1(g)) (granting the SEC authority to impose monetary penalties in proceedings
before an ALJ).
207 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(a) (2012).
208 Asset freezes are court-ordered equitable remedies that prevent defendants
from controlling allegedly illegally-obtained funds until the case against them is
resolved. See, e.g., SEC Announces Asset Freeze Against Alleged EB-5 Fraudster
in Seattle Area, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Aug. 25, 2015), https://
www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-173.html [https://perma.cc/532J-98GZ]
(announcing that a judge in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington issued an order freezing assets of individual accused of defrauding
Chinese investors).
209 Failure to supervise claims arise under the 1940 Advisers Act § 203(e)(6),
15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e)(6) (2012), or Exchange Act § 15(b)(4)(E), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(b)(4)(E) (2012).  Both of these provisions are tied to Commission orders, and
thus cannot be imposed by a judge, except by exercise of equitable authority. See
infra Part IV.C; see also SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT APPROACH
TO FORUM SELECTION IN CONTESTED ACTIONS 1 (2015), https://www.sec.gov/divi-
sions/enforce/enforcement-approach-forum-selection-contested-actions.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3XRQ-MWTV] (“[C]harges of failure to supervise . . . can only
be pursued in the administrative forum”).
210 See, e.g., Zurich Financial Services, Exchange Act Release No. 59,083, 94
SEC Docket 2719 (Dec. 11, 2008) (instituting cease-and-desist order against the
respondent); Complaint, SEC v. Zurich Fin. Servs., 2008 WL 5594777 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 11, 2008) (No. 1:08-cv-10760-WHP) (parallel civil action resulting in $25
million civil penalty).
211 In fact, the sanction is often less severe because cease-and-desist orders
that are imposed in administrative proceedings generally tend to have less signifi-
cant consequences than obey-the-law injunctions imposed in court actions.
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and twenty-one secondary enforcement actions per fiscal
year.212
And finally, the SEC counts every enforcement action filed,
including where the first proceeding is discontinued for failure
to serve the complaint and a new legal proceeding is subse-
quently initiated once the defendant has been located.213  The
SEC sometimes brings an enforcement action before the ALJ
after moving to dismiss a civil action against the same defend-
ants for the same violation, and counts both in the enforcement
action tally.214  Such cases are quite rare and alone would not
significantly bias enforcement statistics.  But they are a mani-
festation of the same reporting problem.
If measured by the number of filed enforcement actions,
the SEC’s enforcement activity increased between 2000 and
2014 by 50%, from 503 to 755 enforcement actions, and
peaked in 2014.215  However, once follow-on and secondary
enforcement actions are excluded from the count, enforcement
actions increased from 388 in fiscal year 2000 to 507 in FY
2014—still a considerable 31% increase.216  However, primary
enforcement actions did not peak in 2014, as suggested by the
SEC’s preferred statistic,217 but in 2009, when the SEC filed
212 The SEC brought twenty-one secondary enforcement actions in 2004 and
in 2007, eleven in 2008 and in 2010, ten in 2000, nine in 2009, three in 2011 and
in 2013, and two in 2012 and 2014.  Data on file with author.
213 See, e.g., Christine M. Zamorsky, Administrative Proceedings Rulings Re-
lease No. 653, 98 SEC Docket 2223 (ALJ June 4, 2010) (discontinuing the pro-
ceeding as to Jeffrey M. Zamorsky for failure to serve); Jeffrey M. Zamorsky,
Exchange Act Release No. 62,938, 99 SEC Docket 1368 (Sept. 20, 2010) (re-filing
the action against Jeffrey M. Zamorsky); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note
146, at 16, 18 (including both actions in the fiscal 2013 tally). R
214 See SEC v. Lawrence B. Irwin, Litigation Release No. 17,302, 2002 WL
27401, at 1 (Jan. 10, 2002), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/
lr17302.htm [https://perma.cc/WHY5-SGBJ] (reporting that the SEC dismissed
the civil action it brought against an investment adviser and its manager and
settled an administrative cease-and-desist that “alleged the same conduct”).  In
several large-scale market timing cases, the SEC first sued defendants in court,
and after dismissing the civil action sued them before the ALJ. See, e.g., Com-
plaint, SEC v. Invesco Funds Grp., Inc., Docket No. 1:03-cv-02421 (D. Colo. Dec.
2, 2003) (beginning lawsuit for market timing against Invesco); Notice of Volun-
tary Dismissal of Case, SEC v. Invesco Funds Grp., Inc., No. 1:03-cv-02421 (D.
Colo. Oct. 8, 2004) (voluntarily dismissing the district court case); Invesco Funds
Group, Inc., Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings,
Exchange Act Release No. 50,506, Investment Company Act 34-50506, 83 SEC
Docket 2872 (Oct. 8, 2004).
215 See infra Table 3A.
216 See infra Table 3B.
217 See Jonathan Weil, The Best SEC Speech Ever, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Apr. 8,
2014), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-04-08/the-best-sec-
speech-ever [http://perma.cc/9YDT-2ETG] (citing a retiring SEC enforcement
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510 new enforcement actions.218  If contempt proceedings and
delinquent filing cases also are removed from the enforcement
action count,219 then SEC primary enforcement has remained
more or less flat between 2002 and 2014, as shown in Figure 2.

























































That, by itself, is not problematic.  Misconduct rates
change over time, declining in normal times and peaking dur-
ing and immediately after investment booms.221  If enforcement
resources are kept constant, one would not expect the number
of serious enforcement actions to continue to increase year
after year.  What is problematic, however, is that SEC leader-
ship continues to highlight the number of filed enforcement
employee for the proposition that the SEC’s enforcement division is obsessed with
measuring its performance by the number of cases it brings).
218 Infra Table 3B.
219 See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
220 For the raw data, see infra Table 2.
221 See, e.g., Paul Povel, Rajdeep Singh & Andrew Winton, Booms, Busts, and
Fraud, 20 REV. FIN. STUD. 1219, 1222 (2007) (showing that fraud can prolong and
exacerbate investment booms, leading to more painful busts); Wang & Winton,
supra note 98, at 24 (explaining study “consistent with the theory of Povel at al. R
(2007)”).
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actions as the single most important statistic measuring its
enforcement activity.222
2. Including Contempt Proceedings and Delinquent Filing
Cases
The SEC’s enforcement activity varies over time, depending
on the violations that occur, their detection, and prosecution.
Most enforcement actions involve misconduct that clearly de-
serves punishment.  Two reported categories that the SEC in-
cludes in its enforcement statistics are different from the rest:
contempt proceedings and delinquent filing cases.
The SEC brings contempt proceedings against defendants
who do not comply with prior SEC enforcement orders.  For
example, the Commission targets auditors who audit SEC-reg-
istered broker-dealers despite being permanently barred from
appearing or practicing before the Commission.223  It sues de-
fendants who fail to pay fines and disgorgements.224  Contempt
orders prosecute violations of remedial orders, not violations of
securities laws.  Contempt proceedings are, by definition, de-
rivative.  They presumably increase compliance with SEC and
court orders, and boost the deterrent effect of securities en-
forcement.  There is no doubt that the SEC should aggressively
pursue defendants who violate its orders, and should report
the number of contempt proceedings filed, but separately.
Contempt proceedings do not belong in a statistic designed to
measure how many securities violations the SEC prosecutes
and how many new cases it brings each year.  The SEC finally
removed contempt proceedings from its count of enforcement
actions in 2013, but reported enforcement figures for the ear-
lier fiscal years remain inflated.225
222 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
223 See SEC Seeks Contempt Finding Against Certified Public Accountant Jo-
seph S. Amundsen, Litigation Release No. 22,150, 102 SEC Docket 1606, at 1
(Nov. 10, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr22150.htm
[https://perma.cc/46PM-LE6P].
224 See Court Finds Bay Area Hedge Fund Manager in Civil Contempt for
Failing to Pay More than $12 Million in Disgorgement to Defrauded Investors,
Litigation Release No. 22,397, 2012 WL 2377217, at 1 (June 25, 2012), https://
www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2012/lr22397.htm [https://perma.cc/XC3L-
36PR].
225 Between 2000 and 2012, the SEC filed enforcement actions in between
nine and forty-seven contempt proceedings, representing between 1% (in 2012)
and 8% (in 2002) of enforcement actions. See infra Table 3B.
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By contrast, enforcement actions brought for delinquent
filings are usually not derivative;226 they are new enforcement
proceedings for never-before prosecuted violations of securities
laws.  Firms whose securities trade on the stock exchanges or
in the over-the-counter market must file quarterly and annual
reports with the SEC on forms 10-Q and 10-K.227  If a publicly
traded firm fails to file mandatory periodic reports, the SEC has
the power to revoke registration of the firm’s common stock and
other securities.228  Doing so is important because such com-
panies’ stock is often used by third parties in pump-and-
dump229 and other schemes, and thus poses real risk to inves-
tors as long as the securities trade publicly.230
But, delinquent filing actions are very different from other
primary enforcement actions.231  First, delinquent filing is a
strict-liability offense: no mens rea is necessary.232  In fact, if
226 The word usually was chosen deliberately.  It is not uncommon for a delin-
quent filing action to follow a primary enforcement action for securities violations.
For example, in September 2010 the SEC prosecuted Spence-Lingo & Company
LTD in an enforcement action for falsely registering as a transfer agent and for
fraudulent disclosures on fund registration statement.  FreedomTree Mutual
Funds and Asset Management LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 63,019, 99 SEC
Docket 1583 (Sept. 30, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2010/34-
63019.pdf [https://perma.cc/A599-Z44Q].  On the same day, the SEC also filed
an enforcement action seeking to revoke registration of Spence-Lingo’s common
stock because Spence-Lingo was delinquent in its filings. Spence-Lingo & Com-
pany Ltd., Exchange Act Release No. 63,020, 99 SEC Docket 1586 (Sept. 30,
2010), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2010/34-63020.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7AMY-84UM].  The SEC proceeded similarly in its enforcement actions
against Rica Foods.  After two primary enforcement actions filed in 2003 and
2008, the SEC brought a delinquent filing proceeding in 2009 to revoke registra-
tion of Rica Foods’ common stock.  Rica Foods, Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
59,174,94 SEC Docket 3174 (Dec. 30, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/
admin/2008/34-59174.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6QM-JLNC].
227 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2012).
228 See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(j) (2012).
229 A “pump-and-dump” scheme involves fraudsters making misleading state-
ments about a company’s stock to the public to increase, or “pump,” the com-
pany’s stock prices.  Once the prices increase, the fraudsters typically “dump”
their stocks and new investors lose money. “Pump-and-Dumps” and Market Ma-
nipulations, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (June 25, 2013), http://
www.sec.gov/answers/pumpdump.htm [https://perma.cc/P4B5-KDWT].
230 See Greg Farrell, SEC Enforcement Activity Lags, USA TODAY (Aug. 20,
2006), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/companies/regulation/2006-
08-20-cox-usat_x.htm [http://perma.cc/DQ23-9EC5] (reporting an increase in
delinquent filing cases and noting that such actions require less work than ac-
counting fraud investigations).
231 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 35, at 22 (citing enforce- R
ment staff’s concerns about giving delinquent filing cases equal weight as “en-
forcement case[s] involving significant violations or market practices”).
232 See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(j) (2012) (“The Commission is authorized . . . to revoke
the registration of a security, if the Commission finds . . . that the issuer[ ] of such
security has failed to comply with any provision of this chapter . . . .”).
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the SEC has evidence of false disclosure, it seeks a different
remedy, either a stop order or accounting fraud charges.233  By
contrast, most primary enforcement actions require the SEC to
show at least negligence and many require a showing of scien-
ter.234  To be fair, the Commission has brought a considerable
number of enforcement actions for strict-liability violations in
fiscal years 2013 and 2014,235 but that is not the norm in
securities enforcement.236
Second, when a firm fails to file periodic reports, the SEC
first suspends trading in its common stock and then revokes
registration of its common stock.237  In delinquent filing ac-
tions, the SEC never imposes sanctions that are common in
other primary enforcement actions, such as those for insider
trading, accounting fraud or investment adviser violations.  It
never orders a company to pay monetary penalties, obtains an
injunction or a cease-and-desist order, or orders that a corpo-
rate monitor be appointed.  The only sanction is to revoke regis-
tration of the common stock.
And third and finally, delinquent filing actions are ordina-
rily decided by default.  Firms, usually empty shells, fail to
respond to the SEC’s order instituting proceedings and an or-
der of default is entered.238  By contrast, defendants charged
with other types of securities misconduct, from accounting
fraud and market manipulation to insider trading, routinely
fight the charges; default judgments are relatively rare.  For
example, of 1,149 defendants targeted in enforcement actions
filed during the 2009 fiscal year (not including delinquent filing
233 See, e.g., Registration Statement of Shopeye Inc., Initial Decision Release
No. 615, 109 SEC Docket 639, at 1 ( ALJ June 16, 2014), (issuing a stop order
against a company that made false statements in its registration statement);
Registration Statement of Mobile Vault, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 9,576,
2014 WL 11022164, at 1 (Apr. 22, 2014), (same).
234 See, e.g., Latour Trading LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 73,125, 2014 WL
4630258, at 12 (Sept. 17, 2014) (finding that defendant Latour willfully violated
securities laws).  In recent years, the SEC has ramped up enforcement of strict-
liability offenses, such as Rule 105 of Regulation M, 17 C.F.R. 242.105 (2015),
and Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2012).
235 See infra Table 3B (noting a considerable number of delinquent filing
cases, which are strict-liability actions, in 2013 and 2014).
236 See discussion infra Part IV.D.
237 See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(j) (2012). See generally OFFICE OF INV’R EDUC. & ADVO-
CACY, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTOR BULLETIN: TRADING SUSPENSIONS (2012),
http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/tradingsuspensions.pdf [https://perma.cc/
CN3X-X5P8] (noting the SEC’s authority to suspend trading during investigation
and subsequently take further enforcement action).
238 See, e.g., Initial Decision on Default, La Paz Mining Corp., Initial Decision
Release No. 580, at 2 (Mar. 20, 2014) (finding respondents in default for failing to
file an answer, appear at the hearing, or “otherwise defend the proceeding”).
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cases and contempt proceedings), 104 defendants (9.1%) failed
to file a responsive pleading, and the SEC obtained a default
judgment.  In fiscal year 2010, 112 defendants (10.7%) of 1,047
charged defaulted.239
FIGURE 3: UNIQUE SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS (2000–2014)

















































































239 The figure does not include delinquent filing cases (596 defendants), con-
tempt proceedings (26 defendants), and relief defendants (151 defendants).  In-
cluding those, the SEC prosecuted 1,817 defendants in 2010. See U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA FISCAL 2010, at 3.
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FIGURE 3B: UNIQUE DEFENDANTS IN SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
(2000–2014)




















































































The SEC’s effort to reduce the risk of manipulation should
be celebrated.  The SEC used to bring ten or so enforcement
actions for delinquent filing against ten or so defendants each
fiscal year.240  Since 2005, it has filed more than fifty delin-
quent filing actions per year, and since 2010 it has brought
more than one-hundred delinquent filing enforcement actions
against five-hundred or more defendants per year.241  Between
2005, when the SEC began seriously policing delinquent filing,
and 2014, it revoked the common stock registration of 4,075
publicly traded firms.242
At the same time, delinquent filing actions really are differ-
ent from other enforcement actions.  Including them in the
overall measure of enforcement output will tend to bias the
indicator upward, as shown in Figures 3A and 3B.  The share of
delinquent filing actions has increased from 2% of the total
number of enforcement actions (and 1.8% of defendants) in
240 See infra Table 3B.
241 See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 146, at 3 (reporting 132 R
delinquent filing cases against 560 defendants).
242 Based on the number of cases listed in annual reports and Select SEC and
Market Data reports between 2005 and 2014.  See Reports, supra note 129.
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fiscal 2003 to 20% (and 35% of defendants) in fiscal 2013.243
Since 2004, the overall numbers of enforcement actions and
defendants targeted have increased by about one hundred, less
than the increase in the number of delinquent filing cases.  As
a result, the number of enforcement actions that require the
SEC to show a guilty or at least negligent mind has declined.244
Yet the statistics on enforcement activity and defendant counts
that the SEC reports to Congress obscure this potentially sig-
nificant trend.
3. Counting Defendants
The SEC reports the number of defendants in addition to
reporting the number of enforcement actions.245  Reporting the
number of discrete individuals and firms investigated and
prosecuted for securities violations could mitigate considerably
the measurement bias introduced by the way in which the SEC
counts enforcement actions.  Unfortunately, when the SEC
counts defendants, it does not count discrete individuals and
firms that it targets.  Rather, it counts up the parties named in
enforcement actions filed and reports them as defendants
targeted.  For example, Robert A. Gist, whom the SEC targeted
in 2013 in one primary and two follow-on enforcement actions
arising from the same violation, was counted in the 2013 tally
of defendants three times, instead of only once.246  As a result,
just as the Commission counts follow-on and secondary cases
more than once, it also counts defendants identified in such
actions two or three times.  According to my research, between
150 and 300 defendants each year are counted more than once
due to follow-on and secondary enforcement.
243 Excluding follow-on and secondary cases, delinquent filing cases were 28%
of primary enforcement actions and 41% of defendants in 2013. See infra Table
3B.
244 Cf. Burns & Scannell, supra note 31, at C3 (reporting that the increase in R
delinquent filing enforcement actions “conceal[s] a steep decline in enforcement
cases”).
245 See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 109, at 3. R
246 See supra notes 200–02 and accompanying text. R
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In addition, the SEC reports as defendants not only those
violating securities laws but also relief defendants: individuals
and entities who are not charged with securities violations.
Rather, they are named as relief or nominal defendants be-
cause they received property that was originally obtained ille-
gally and to which they have no legitimate claim.247  An
argument in favor of including relief defendants in the count is
that relief defendants tend to fight SEC’s charges much in the
same way as primary defendants,248 requiring the SEC to ex-
pend its limited enforcement resources.  At the same time,
nonculpable individuals are, by definition, not securities viola-
tors that the SEC punishes.
If the number of relief defendants remained stable over
time, including them in the count would merely overstate the
true number of securities violators targeted in SEC enforce-
ment.  But the number is not stable.  Unlike “real” defendants,
whose assets are often frozen when the SEC brings a signifi-
cant enforcement action, the SEC cannot freeze relief defend-
ants’ assets.  As a result, it usually pursues relief defendants
247 See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Collelo, 139 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1998)
(explaining that a “nominal defendant” is someone who “has received ill gotten
funds and . . . does not have a legitimate claim to those funds”).
248 See id. at 676–77 (relief defendant fighting the SEC’s charges in much the
same way as a primary defendant).
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only when the primary defendant is judgment proof, and the
amount that the relief defendant received is large.249  This is
very common in Ponzi schemes and offering frauds, and much
less common in accounting fraud and insider trading cases.
The number of relief defendants thus varies considerably from
year to year, depending largely on the number of offering frauds
and Ponzi schemes prosecuted.250  In 2009, the fiscal year in
which Madoff’s Ponzi scheme came to light, the SEC prose-
cuted a record number of similar schemes.251  It also prose-
cuted 197 relief defendants (11% of all defendants).  By
contrast, in fiscal 2013, the SEC went after 55 relief defendants
(3% of all reported defendants).
4. Aggregate Monetary Penalties
The second most significant and widely reported statistic,
after the number of enforcement actions filed, is the amount of
monetary penalties ordered by the SEC.  It is also the only
statistic that reports on the remedies secured in securities en-
forcement, and not on the number of filings.  As noted above,
the SEC prevails in the vast majority of enforcement actions.  It
secures some monetary penalties in many of its actions, but
certainly not in all.252  In addition to ordering defendants to
pay, it also secures injunctions, which defendants often fight
more than monetary penalties because injunctions often lead
to a permanent or temporary ban from the securities industry
and trigger automatic disqualifications.253  In actions against
firms, the SEC usually requires independent consultants to
249 Proceedings of the 2007 Midwest Securities Law Institute Symposium, 8 J.
BUS. & SEC. L. 59, 96 (2007) (“We don’t charge relief defendants in every case. It’s
probably more the exception to the rule.”) (quoting Steven Klawans, Chicago
Branch Chief, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Enforcement Div.).
250 See id. at 95.  In 2014, the SEC sued seventy-one relief defendants.  Of the
seventy-one, fifty-nine were sued in connection with offering fraud or Ponzi
schemes.
251 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2009 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY RE-
PORT 9–11, 128–29 (2009) (detailing the SEC’s efforts against Ponzi schemes in FY
2009).
252 According to my research, of cases filed in fiscal 2009 (not including con-
tempt proceedings, follow-on and secondary actions, delinquent filing actions,
and relief defendants), the SEC secured some monetary penalties against 45% of
defendants.  Another 15% were put in receivership or were ordered to pay mone-
tary penalties that were simultaneously waived because of restitution ordered in a
parallel criminal action and/or defendant’s inability to pay.
253 See Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Understanding
Disqualifications, Exemptions and Waivers Under the Federal Securities Laws
(March 12, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/031215-spch-cmjw.html
[https://perma.cc/SDK3-NFVM] (discussing the relationship between disqualifi-
cations and enforcement remedies and waivers from those remedies).
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oversee compliance, sometimes requires that employees be ter-
minated, and so forth.  To perform any sort of deterrence analy-
sis, much more comprehensive data on sanctions would be
needed.
Monetary penalties as reported are less problematic than
the enforcement action count,254 but still require three adjust-
ments to be valid.  First, it is not unusual for the SEC to prose-
cute a defendant concurrently with criminal authorities.  The
U.S. Attorney’s Office usually intervenes in the parallel SEC’s
civil proceeding and requests a stay,255 but not always.  In a
nonnegligible number of cases, the SEC orders the defendant
to pay disgorgement, agreeing to credit dollar-for-dollar any
amount that the defendant is ordered to pay as restitution in a
criminal case.256  In addition, the SEC sometimes includes a
civil fine ordered by another enforcement agency or one of the
exchanges in its enforcement order.257  If one were to report
aggregate monetary penalties imposed by various enforcement
agencies, such fines and disgorgements would be counted
twice: once in the SEC’s tally and for the second time in the
tally reported by the U.S. Department of Justice, other agen-
cies, or the exchanges.  The amounts involved are routinely in
the tens, sometimes hundreds of millions.
Second, the SEC also includes in its aggregate tally mone-
tary penalties ordered but waived either due to defendant’s
inability to pay, in light of criminal penalties imposed, or to
reward defendant’s cooperation.258  A defendant punished with
a decade or longer prison sentence would usually be unable to
pay any fine imposed.  But such penalties should generally not
be included in reported aggregate monetary penalties.
Finally, and less problematically, the SEC highlights mon-
etary penalties ordered, not collected.  Of $4.17 billion in or-
dered monetary penalties in fiscal 2014, the SEC has been able
254 In fact, because of the challenges involved in cross-country comparisons of
enforcement actions, one commentator proposed to focus on monetary penalties
instead. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 24, at 270. R
255 See supra note 176 and accompanying text; see also Thomas C. Newkirk, R
Assoc. Dir., Div. of Enf’t, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n & Ira L. Brandriss, Staff Att’y,
Div. of Enf’t, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Staff: The Advantages of a
Dual System: Parallel Streams of Civil and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S.
Securities Laws, at IX(B) (Sept. 19, 1998), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
speecharchive/1998/spch222.htm [https://perma.cc/HL6L-5JYA] (hereinafter
Advantages of a Dual System).
256 See Advantages of a Dual System, supra note 255, at IV(C). R
257 See id.
258 See SEC, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 70, at 43 (comparing financial R
penalties ordered to those actually collected).
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to collect $2.1 billion, or just about half of the amount or-
dered.259  The aggregate amount collected is still higher than in
any prior year except for 2005, but it is considerably smaller
than the amount ordered.  The SEC’s ability to collect fines
depends on whether defendants it targets are solvent or not.260
The J.P. Morgans of the world pay the entire monetary penalty
ordered, while Ponzi schemers like Allan Stanford cannot and
do not.261  Focusing too much on collections could skew the
SEC’s enforcement effort toward solvent defendants, at the ex-
pense of pursuing penny stock frauds, pyramid schemes, and
the like.
But the way that the Commission presents its statistics on
monetary penalties makes it very easy even for informed re-
searchers to miss that the SEC collects far less than it or-
ders.262  For example, the SEC uses the terms “secured”263 or
“obtained”264 when describing monetary penalties, implying
that the amounts were collected, not merely that such orders
were imposed.
B. Problem 2: Reliability
A reliable measure is one that is consistent, producing sim-
ilar results under consistent conditions.  For example, tracking
the venue in which the SEC files an enforcement action—dis-
trict court or the administrative forum—tells us something
meaningful about litigation choices and can be reported relia-
bly: one only needs to record where the action was filed which
the SEC reports unambiguously.  A measure can be reliable
but not valid: the variable “enforcement action” discussed
259 See id.
260 See id. at 43, Performance Indicator 2.3.5 (explaining why the SEC orders
defendants to pay monetary penalties that it knows that they cannot pay).
261 Allen Stanford was convicted of convicted of defrauding almost 30,000
investors in a $7 billion Ponzi scheme across over 100 countries. See Clifford
Krauss, Stanford Convicted by Jury in $7 Billion Ponzi Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6,
2012, at B1.
262 For example, in fiscal year 2011, the SEC ordered $2.8 billion in monetary
penalties and collected about half, $1.5 billion. See SEC, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 70, at 43.  Yet an article published in the Harvard Law Review in 2014 R
reports the higher figure as the amount that the SEC recovered, not the lower,
correct figure. See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 137, at 855 (noting that the SEC R
reported “total recoveries of $2.8 billion”) (emphasis added).
263 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FY 2011 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY RE-
PORT 192 (2011), http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2011.pdf#2011review
[https://perma.cc/Y7NW-QYP7].
264 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IN BRIEF: FY 2013 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 1
(2012), http://www.sec.gov/about/secfy13congbudgjust.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W4W8-MXTP].
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above measures consistently the number of initiated proceed-
ings, but because those include many follow-on and secondary
actions against the same defendant for the same misconduct, it
does not measure what we want to measure: new securities
enforcement activity.265
A measure is not reliable when it cannot be reproduced
consistently.266  As noted in the previous section, when report-
ing its enforcement output, the SEC counts the number of legal
proceedings initiated.  It can increase the number by filing sep-
arate complaints against multiple defendants charged with the
same violation based on the same set of facts when it could file
a single complaint.  Also, the SEC categorizes enforcement ac-
tions by primary subject-matter.  Case categorization is within
the discretion of the enforcement staff at the first instance, and
then reviewed by the Office of the Secretary.267  Because cate-
gorization is inconsistent from year to year, reliability suffers.
1. Slicing and Dicing
Litigated cases are usually consolidated to preserve re-
sources.  In securities litigation, plaintiffs ordinarily file two,
three, or more complaints in different courts.268  The cases are
ultimately consolidated, and defendants—the fraud firm, its
auditor, sometimes officers or directors—litigate a single case
and pay damages into a single pot.269  Because securities class
actions are routinely consolidated, reporting the number of
filed securities class actions provides a useful and reliable met-
ric to track securities litigation over time.270
This is not the case with SEC enforcement.  Like securities
litigation, a majority of SEC cases are ultimately settled.271
But unlike private suits, which are never settled at the time
265 See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
266 See CARMINES & ZELLER, supra note 185, at 12 (describing a measure as R
reliable when repeated measures yield the same result).
267 Telephone Interview with Jason Flemmons (Sept. 27, 2015).
268 Cf. Adam B. Badawi & David H. Webber, Does the Quality of the Plaintiffs’
Law Firm Matter in Deal Litigation?, 41 J. CORP. L. (2016) (forthcoming) (reporting
that 2.8 complaints are filed on average in each class action targeting
acquisitions).
269 Cf. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2014 YEAR IN
REVIEW 8 (2015), https://www.cornerstone.com/GetAttachment/52bfaa16-ff84-
43b9-b7e7-8b2c7ab6df43/Securities-Class-Action-Filings-2014-Year-in-Re
view.pdf [https://perma.cc/WU7Y-L458] (reporting percentage of filings where
class action suit also targeted underwriter or auditor).
270 See, e.g., id. at 4 (reporting the number of cases filed annually as a mea-
sure of litigation activity).
271 See JORGE BAEZ, JAMES A. OVERDAHL & ELAINE BUCKBERG, NAT’L ECON. RE-
SEARCH ASSOCS., SEC SETTLEMENT TRENDS: 2H12 UPDATE 2 (2013).
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they are filed, many of the SEC’s cases are.  In fiscal 2009, for
example, the SEC sued 1,149 defendants.272  Of those, 436
(37.9%) had settled by the time that the legal proceeding was
initiated.  Of 1,047 defendants sued in fiscal year 2014, 547
(52.2%) settled with the SEC before the enforcement action was
filed.273
When the SEC litigates cases, it has the same incentive as
every other litigant: consolidate to the extent possible to pre-
serve resources.274  By contrast, when the SEC brings a settled
enforcement action, the cost pressure to consolidate disap-
pears.  Because the SEC counts legal proceedings filed, and not
investigations that yield at least one enforcement action, it has
an incentive to file multiple settled actions where it could file
one to increase the number of enforcement actions filed.  For
example, in a coordinated action with the Public Company Ac-
counting Oversight Board (PCAOB) against an audit firm, the
PCAOB brought a single action against the audit firm and two
of its partners.275  By contrast, the SEC brought three separate
settled enforcement actions: against the firm and each of the
partners.276  Similarly, in December 2005 the SEC completed
its investigation into campaign contributions and subsequent
participation in municipal bond offerings.  Executives of CIBC
World Markets Corporation (CIBC) made contributions for Cali-
fornia Governor Gray Davis’ re-election bid.277  The rules
barred CIBC from participating in municipal offerings for two
272 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA: FISCAL 2009, at 3
(2009).  The count does not include contempt proceedings and delinquent filing
cases, and only includes defendants charged with securities violations, not relief
defendants.
273 Data on file with author. The count does not include contempt proceedings
and delinquent filing cases, and only includes defendants charged with securities
violations, not relief defendants.
274 See, e.g., Thomas Y. Jimenez (CPA), Exchange Act Release No. 65,466, 102
SEC Docket 266, at 2 (Oct. 3, 2011) (explaining that the court consolidated 2007
and 2008 cases against GlobeTel and its former CFO).
275 See Chisholm, Bierwolf, Nilson & Morrill, LLC, Todd D. Chisholm, CPA &
Troy F. Nilson, CPA, PCAOB Release No. 115-2011-003, at 1 (Apr. 8, 2011), http:/
/pcaobus.org/Enforcement/Decisions/Documents/Chisholm.pdf [https://
perma.cc/R5CV-DD8L].
276 See Chisholm, Bierwolf, Nilson & Morrill, LLC, Exchange Act Release No.
64,280, 100 SEC Docket 3209, at 1 (Apr. 8, 2011); Todd D. Chisholm, CPA,
Exchange Act Release No. 64,279, 100 SEC Docket 3204, at 1 (Apr. 8, 2011); Troy
F. Nilson, CPA, Exchange Act Release No. 64,277, 100 SEC Docket 3194, at 1
(Apr. 8, 2011).
277 CIBC World Markets Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 52,942, 86 SEC
Docket 2262, at 2–4 (Dec. 12, 2005).
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years,278 but CIBC served as underwriter in several offerings
during the disqualification period.279  The firm and three indi-
viduals, all employees of CIBC, settled before the SEC initiated
formal legal proceedings.  The SEC could have brought one
enforcement action but brought four instead, one against each
participant in the scheme.280
I do not want to suggest that the SEC files multiple enforce-
ment actions in order to improve its end-of-the-year numbers.
I have no evidence that the SEC brings separate cases oppor-
tunistically, merely that it does so without a good explanation
as to why.  More often than not, the SEC files separate actions
because some of the defendants have settled while the others
have not.  There are several examples in the fiscal year 2014
alone.  The SEC investigation into accounting manipulation at
the Regions Financial Corporation targeted the firm and three
individuals.  Regions Financial Corporation entered into a de-
ferred prosecution agreement that was not reported as an en-
forcement action.281  Two of three individual defendants
settled, while the third fought the charges.  The SEC filed two
separate enforcement actions,282 closed the one against set-
tling defendants quickly while the second settled a year
later,283 and reported two enforcement actions in its annual
enforcement report.284  The Commission did something very
278 See id. at 2 n.2 (stating that the contribution violated Municipal Securities
Rulemaking Board Rule G-37(b) and Exchange Act § 15B(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-
4(c)(1)).
279 Id. at 3–4.
280 Id. at 1; Paul D. Rogers, Exchange Act Release No. 52,941, 86 SEC Docket
2260, at 1 (Dec. 12, 2005); Peter J. Crowley, Exchange Act Release No. 52,943, 86
SEC Docket 2264, at 1 (Dec. 12, 2005); Robert J. Dentice, Exchange Act Release
No. 52,944, 86 SEC Docket 2266, at 1 (Dec. 12, 2005).
281 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENT 9 (2014),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2014/2014-125-dpa.pdf [https://perma.cc/
XY3Z-7KGM] (signed agreement between Regions Financial Corp. and the SEC);
see also supra note 161 and accompanying text (deferred prosecution agreements R
not included in 2014 enforcement action count).
282 See Jeffrey C. Kuehr, Securities Act Release No. 9,606, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 72,471, 109 SEC Docket 656, at 1 (June 25, 2014) (case against settling
defendants); Thomas A. Neely, Jr., Securities Act Release No. 9,605, Exchange Act
Release No. 72,470, 109 SEC Docket 561, at 1 (June 25, 2014) (case against non-
settling defendant).
283 See Thomas A. Neely, Jr., Securities Act Release No. 9,772, Exchange Act
Release No. 74,976, 2015 WL 2328702 (May 15, 2015).
284 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 109, at 15. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-4\CRN401.txt unknown Seq: 53  4-MAY-16 11:55
2016] REPORTING AGENCY PERFORMANCE 953
similar following its investigations into accounting fraud at
QSGI Inc.285 and Natural Blue Resources.286
In addition, at least sometimes the SEC conducts one in-
vestigation but files multiple enforcement actions based on the
same set of facts because of a statutory directive.  For example,
Section 8(d) of the Securities Act sets out the requirement for
initiating stop order proceedings, implying that the SEC must
bring separate proceedings for each affected registration state-
ment.287  In 2014 the SEC investigated John Briner’s scheme
in which he set up twenty mining companies and filed registra-
tion statements offering stock to public investors.288  The state-
ments contained misrepresentations and failed to disclose that
Briner, a recidivist, was promoting the offerings.289  Based on
one investigation, SEC initiated twenty separate administrative
stop order proceedings and reported them as twenty enforce-
ment actions.290
Even if the SEC rarely slices and dices investigations into
many enforcement actions opportunistically, which would
285 See Edward L. Cummings, Exchange Act Release No. 72,722, 109 SEC
Docket 2614, at 1–2 (July 30, 2014) (settling with the SEC); Marc Sherman,
Exchange Act Release No. 72,723, 109 SEC Docket 2620, at 1–2 (July 30, 2014)
(opposing the SEC’s charges); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 109, at 15 R
(counting both actions separately in the annual report).
286 See Erik H. Perry, Securities Act Release No. 9,615, Exchange Act Release
No. 72,618, 109 SEC 1519, at 1–2 (July 16, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/litiga
tion/admin/2014/33-9615.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UL7-ZWBJ] (settling at the
time of filing on both liability and monetary sanctions); Toney Anaya, Securities
Act Release No. 9,613, Exchange Act Release No. 72,616, 109 SEC Docket 1509,
at 1–2 (July 16, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2014/33-
9613.pdf [https://perma.cc/52RT-5TH2] (settling at the time of filing on liability
but deferring decision on monetary sanctions); Natural Blue Resources, Inc.,
Securities Act Release No. 9,614, Exchange Act Release No. 72,617, 109 SEC
Docket 1512, at 1 (July 16, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2014/
33-9614.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5YS-ZKGT] (instituting proceedings against de-
fendants that contest liability); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 109, at 15 R
(counting both actions separately in the annual report).
287 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (2012).
288 See SEC Seeks Stop Orders Against 20 Purported Mining Companies With




290 See, e.g., The Registration Statement of La Paz Mining Corp., Securities Act
Release No. 9,523, 108 SEC Docket 751, at 2 (Feb. 3, 2014), https://www.sec.
gov/litigation/admin/2014/33-9523.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2AZ-JJR7] (noting
that the respondent company was controlled by John Briner); see also U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 109, at 14 (listing each of the twenty enforcement R
actions separately).  While the SEC charged each defendant firm separately, it
produced a single order suspending all twenty registration statements. See Initial
Decision on Default, La Paz Mining Corp., Initial Decision Release No. 580, 108
SEC Docket 2239, at 5 (Mar. 20, 2014).
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clearly render the measure unreliable, it is still problematic to
use the number of enforcement actions as a measure of the
likelihood of enforcement; the count depends on the defend-
ants’ willingness to settle and other extraneous factors unre-
lated to the prevalence of misconduct or the SEC’s ability to
detect and prosecute misconduct.291
2. Inconsistent Case Categorization
In addition to reporting the aggregate number of enforce-
ment actions, the SEC also reports the primary subject-matter
for each action.292  The SEC’s subject-matter categorization
could be exceptionally useful for studying enforcement trends
in a subset of offenses, such as insider trading or accounting
fraud.  The SEC regularly includes aggregate figures on the
number of actions filed in various categories in reports and
congressional testimony as evidence of vigorous activity.293
Unfortunately, the categories are overbroad and combine
types of violations that should not obviously be lumped to-
gether.  For example, penny stock frauds and strict-liability
violations of Rule 105 of Regulation M are both included under
the umbrella category Market Manipulation, although the vio-
lators, victims, and affected markets do not overlap.  Similarly,
accounting frauds are nearly always categorized as Issuer Re-
porting and Disclosure cases,294 but not all Issuer Reporting
and Disclosure cases are accounting frauds.  Some prosecute
books-and-records violations that are not fraudulent, others
require officers to reimburse firms for unjustified bonuses re-
ceived.  Finally, a considerable number are follow-on and sec-
291 See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
292 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 109, at 3. R
293 See, e.g., supra notes 21, 114 (demonstrating prominent instances where R
the SEC used its aggregate numbers); see also Mary L. Schapiro, Chair, Testi-
mony Concerning SEC Oversight: Current State and Agenda, Before the United
States House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services Subcommittee
on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (July 14,
2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts071409mls.htm [https://
perma.cc/Z82F-ST2Z] (highlighting a number of cases in specific enforcement
categories).
294 One important exception are cases where investment managers overstate
the value of assets in their funds, which the SEC records as an Investment
Adviser case even though it is at core accounting fraud. See Evergreen Invest-
ment Management Company, LLC & Evergreen Investment Services, Inc., Ex-
change Act Release No. 60,059, Investment Company Act Release No. 2,888, 96
SEC Docket 118, at 2 (June 8, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/
2009/34-60059.pdf [https://perma.cc/YE4E-J8QM] (alleging that Evergreen
overstate the value of assets in one of its funds); see also U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, supra note 272, at 10 (listing the enforcement action in the category R
Investment Adviser).
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ondary proceedings, a problem described in more detail in Part
III.A.1.  These concerns render quick assessments of SEC en-
forcement by looking at the number of enforcement actions in
each subject-matter category largely pointless.295
Removing follow-on and secondary cases does not fix the
problem with vagueness in subject-matter categorization.
Many cases that the SEC investigates could be included in
more than one category, but are reported in only one.  For
example, Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi scheme was categorized as a
violation of rules pertaining to investment advisors.296  It was
also a violation of the rules pertaining of the offering of securi-
ties—many Ponzi schemes are classified as such297—and a vio-
lation of rules regarding broker-dealers.298  This is a known
challenge in SEC reporting and the Commission readily ac-
knowledges it.299  The SEC’s primary concern with reporting
only primary subject-matter categories is that the SEC’s re-
ported figures understate the number of enforcement actions
filed in a given subject area, such as insider trading.300
But the reported figures also overstate the number of en-
forcement actions filed in each category.  The primary cause for
inflated figures is duplicative counting of follow-on and secon-
dary actions, discussed above.301  The secondary cause is the
fact that subject-matter categorization is at first step within the
discretion of the enforcement staff and secondarily reassessed
by the SEC’s Office of the Secretary.  When an enforcement
action can plausibly fit into more than one category, the staff or
the Office of the Secretary can categorize the action as one
category in one year and another category in a subsequent
year.
Some inconsistent categorizations are clearly errors.  But
other inconsistencies seem biased.  For example, the Commis-
sion has traditionally classified all enforcement actions
295 See, e.g., Eaglesham & Rapoport, supra note 6 (tracking enforcement ac- R
tions for accounting fraud using the SEC’s reported figures without adjustment).
296 OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 112, at 24. R
297 Oversight of the Security and Exchange Commission’s Failure to Identify the
Bernard L. Madoff Ponzi Scheme and How to Improve SEC Performance: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 98 (2009)
(statement of Robert Khuzami, Director, Division of Enforcement, Securities and
Exchange Commission & John Walsh, Acting Director, Office of Compliance In-
spections & Examinations, Securities and Exchange Commission).
298 Id.
299 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 109, at 3 (“Each action initiated R
has been included in only one category listed below, even though many actions
involved multiple allegations and may fall under more than one category.”).
300 See IMF, supra note 24, at 186 n.349. R
301 Supra notes 195–205 and accompanying text. R
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brought under section 12(j) of the Exchange Act as Delinquent
Filing actions.302  In 2014, however, three such cases were
classified as Issuer Reporting and Disclosure actions,303 one as
Market Manipulation and another as Securities Offering.  But
no Market Manipulation or Issuer Reporting action was coded
as a Delinquent Filing action.  Similar miscategorizations ap-
pear in enforcement reports for the years 2010, 2012, and
2013.  Miscategorization is not a new problem.  In 2004, the
SEC categorized five Contempt Proceedings as primary enforce-
ment actions in Broker-Dealer and Investment Adviser catego-
ries, and in 2010, it categorized four Contempt Proceedings as
Miscellaneous actions and four Delinquent Filing actions as
Issuer Reporting and Disclosure and Investment Adviser
actions.
In addition, twenty-seven enforcement actions filed in
2014 and categorized as “Issuer Reporting and Disclosure” ac-
tions were stop order proceedings under Section 8(d) of the
Securities Act.304  In these actions the Commission sought to
suspend the effectiveness of a registration statement that it
believed included an untrue statement or omission of material
fact.  Issuers file registration statements when they seek to
offer new securities to the public.  And so, such actions should
be categorized as Securities Offering actions.  By contrast, Is-
suer Reporting and Disclosure actions primarily involve ac-
counting, auditing, and reporting issues in periodic reports
that issuers are required to file, not fraud in offering docu-
ments.305  In fact, in fiscal year 2013, the SEC classified a stop
order under Section 8(d) as a Securities Offering case,306 but in
fiscal year 2015, the SEC again classified eleven stop orders as
302 Classification errors occur.  For example, in fiscal 2010, one delinquent
filing case is classified under Investment Adviser category and another as Issuer
Disclosure and Reporting violation. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note
239, at 6–14. R
303 See Jason S. Flemmons & Martin S. Wilczynski, SEC Enforcement’s Ac-
counting Statistics for Fiscal 2014—Up or Down, SECURITIES DOCKET (Jan. 21,
2015), http://www.securitiesdocket.com/2015/01/21/sec-enforcements-ac
counting-statistics-for-fiscal-2014-up-or-down/ [https://perma.cc/M59H-ZP79]
(reporting that the SEC classified five delinquent filing cases and issuer reporting
cases).
304 Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (2012) (codifying Securities Act § 8(d)).
305 Id.
306 See The Registration Statement of Counseling International, Inc., Securi-
ties Act Release No. 9,444, 106 SEC Docket 4854, at 1 (Aug. 22, 2013); U.S. SEC.
& EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 146, at 17.  But back in 2002, the SEC classified two R
stop orders as “Issuer Reporting and Disclosure Cases.”  SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
supra note 178, at 151, 154. R
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Issuer Reporting and Disclosure actions, not Securities Offer-
ing actions.
These might seem like small infractions except that the
SEC has celebrated the increase in Issuer Reporting and Dis-
closure cases prosecuted in 2014.307  Once follow-on and sec-
ondary actions, and miscategorized actions are removed from
the tally, the number of enforcement actions for accounting
fraud filed in fiscal 2014 is the same as in fiscal 2013.308  Al-
though categorization inconsistencies are likely due to human
error, they are problematic because they render the SEC’s re-
ported figures unreliable for long-term study of enforcement
trends.  To obtain reliable results, one cannot use the SEC’s
reported tables but must code enforcement actions by hand.309
IV
THE CONSEQUENCES OF REPORTING PROBLEMS
The SEC has used invalid and unreliable statistics in con-
gressional reports and testimony, press releases, and public
speeches to suggest an increase in activity, to calm wary inves-
tors and the general public after scandals, and to suggest a
better use of resources.310  In turn, consumers of the SEC’s
statistics, including law firms and legal academics, have relied
on them to identify enforcement trends in widely distributed
client memoranda311 and to offer policy prescriptions regarding
securities enforcement.
307 See Mary Jo White, Chair, Chairman’s Address at SEC Speaks 2015 (Feb.
20, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2015-spch022015mjw.html
[https://perma.cc/MH2L-2F3S] (highlighting the 40% increase in financial re-
porting cases in 2014); Andrew Ceresney, Director Div. of Enforcement, Testi-
mony on “Oversight of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement” (Mar. 19, 2015), http:/
/www.sec.gov/news/testimony/031915-test.html#.VRPx7vnF-n8 [https://
perma.cc/3649-2XY8] (referencing a 40% increase in financial reporting and au-
diting enforcement actions in FY 2014).
308 See infra Table 3B.
309 In addition, SEC reporting used to be more useful.  The Commission used
to produce a more detailed classification than it does now. Compare U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 178, at 144 (breaking down enforcement actions into 18 R
different classifications), with U.S. SEC & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 146, at 3 R
(reporting 13 classifications).
310 It is possible that Congress is aware that the numbers are fuzzy and does
not object because increasing SEC enforcement statistics make Congress look
good too.  After all, few members of Congress want to come out in favor of more
fraud.  For a more detailed discussion, see Velikonja, Politics in Securities Enforce-
ment, supra note 33. R
311 See, e.g., Tracy Richelle High & Malaika R. Staten, New Trends in SEC
Enforcement Activity, in COLLEEN VALLEN ET AL., BASICS OF ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS
2015: WHAT EVERY PRACTICING LAWYER NEEDS TO KNOW 207 (2015) (citing the SEC’s
unadjusted statistics); David B. Bayless & Tammy Albarrán, Covington & Burling
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The problems identified in Part III distort the SEC’s report-
ing in a variety of ways.  First and most obviously, they over-
state the Commission’s activity levels and distort assessments
of enforcement intensity.  The figures also obscure real
problems and suggest the presence non-existent problems.
Flawed statistics bleed into other aspects of SEC reporting
when the Commission uses one statistic as a denominator to
generate a new performance indicator, such as its success rate.
Finally, not only do the used statistics fail to represent the
SEC’s true enforcement output, they also have the potential to
distort its enforcement choices in favor of easier investigations
of strict-liability violations that are more likely to yield reporta-
ble results.
A. Overstatement
The SEC’s statistics regularly overstate its enforcement
output: reporting follow-on and secondary cases in the enforce-
ment action tally inflates the number of new cases filed, and
overstates the number of individuals and firms targeted in SEC
enforcement;312 so does including in the SEC’s overall count
monetary penalties imposed by other agencies or waived.313
Overstating enforcement statistics is problematic because
it suggests that SEC enforcement is more vigorous than it re-
ally is.  It renders comparisons with other enforcement agen-
cies that do not misreport in the same manner meaningless.
LLP, The Changing Composition of SEC Enforcement Actions, LAW360.COM (Feb. 21,
2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/416542/the-changing-composition-of-
sec-enforcement-actions [https://perma.cc/ECV8-WSLR] (article written by law
firm partners using the SEC’s statistics unadjusted); Sara Gilley et al., SEC Focus
on Administrative Proceedings: Midyear Checkup, LAW360.COM (May 27, 2015),
http://www.law360.com/articles/659945/sec-focus-on-administrative-proceed
ings-midyear-checkup [http://perma.cc/4UDF-XUKR] (same); Ben A. Indek et
al., Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, A Snapshot of 2012 SEC and FINRA Enforce-
ment, LAW360.COM (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/416009/a-
snapshot-of-2012-sec-and-finra-enforcement [http://perma.cc/B5WY-9ZG6 ]
(same); David F. Marcus & Sara E. Gilley, The Changing Nature of SEC Enforce-
ment Actions, LAW360.COM (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/
477979/the-changing-nature-of-sec-enforcement-actions [http://perma.cc/
4UDF-XUKR] (same); SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, SEC ENFORCEMENT YEAR IN REVIEW
(2014), http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/
2014/01/SECEnforcementYearinReview2013Litigation021114.pdf [https://
perma.cc/U8C7-H65E] (using the SEC’s unadjusted statistics in a note to the




312 See supra notes 196–205. R
313 See supra notes 250–252. R
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Overstatement in the numbers of enforcement actions and de-
fendants is greater in subject-matter categories with a dispro-
portionate share of follow-on and secondary cases, such as
enforcement against broker-dealers and investment advisers.
Almost 60% of enforcement actions classified as Broker-Dealer
between 2000 and 2014 are follow-on actions triggered by
other securities violations, such as insider trading or offering
fraud; 40% of enforcement actions in the Investment Adviser
category are follow-on actions.314  Inflated statistics thus sug-
gest that the SEC is a much more serious enforcer in the finan-
cial industry than it really is.315
Despite known problems with enforcement statistics, high-
ranking SEC employees routinely use them without acknowl-
edgment that they might be overstated.  For example, former
SEC enforcement director Linda Chatman Thomsen testified
before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary that be-
tween 2001 and 2006, the SEC brought over 300 enforcement
actions (304) categorized as Insider Trading cases against well
over 600 defendants (646).316  But once the figures are ad-
justed for follow-on and duplicative cases, the total falls to 252
enforcement actions against 589 unique defendants.317  In
fact, during her testimony, Ms. Thomsen suggested that the
count she reported was too low because insider trading actions
are sometimes categorized as Broker-Dealer actions.318  The
suggestion omits that all such cases were follow-on proceed-
ings against broker-dealers who had already been fined for
insider trading violations, and the primary enforcement actions
for insider trading were already counted and included in the
SEC’s annual report.
314 Between 2011 and 2014, the relative shares of follow-on actions were 73%
for Broker-Dealer cases and 50% of Investment Adviser cases. See infra Tables
3A, 3B & 3C.
315 Even in the two enforcement categories where the SEC has been most
active during the last decade and a half—Issuer Reporting and Disclosure (i.e.,
accounting fraud) and Securities Offering—follow-on cases represent 27–28% of
all enforcement actions filed between 2000 and 2014 and thereby inflate the
count by that percentage. See id.
316 See Linda Chatman Thomsen, Director, Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, Testimony Concerning Insider Trading, Before the U.S. Senate
Committee on the Judiciary (Sept. 26, 2006), https://www.sec.gov/news/testi
mony/2006/ts092606lct.htm#18 [https://perma.cc/5PCF-XDMY].
317 See infra Table 3B.
318 See Thomsen, supra note 316, at n.18. R
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B. Meaningless Trend Analysis
The number of follow-on and secondary cases fluctuates
over time.319  As a result, not only does the SEC’s preferred
method of counting enforcement actions and defendants over-
state the SEC’s enforcement activity, it also renders trend anal-
ysis useless unless such cases are analyzed separately.320
Agencies are required by statute to report on trends related
to their activities.321  Moreover, there is considerable public
interest in identifying trends and reading the tea leaves in en-
forcement.  In the last decade, and in particular during the last
five years, the SEC’s press releases and reporting on SEC en-
forcement have relied heavily on reported enforcement statis-
tics to suggest an increase or a decline in the Commission’s
enforcement overall or in a subset of cases.322
For example, including the ever-growing number of delin-
quent filing actions in the number of enforcement actions filed
obscures the fact that SEC enforcement for negligence- and
scienter-based securities violations has not increased since
2002.323  The analysis of enforcement actions brought in sub-
ject-matter categories as reported by the SEC, such as insider
trading or accounting fraud, is even more prone to biases.  It is
not rare that the SEC reports an underlying decline as im-
provement.  For example, after Madoff’s Ponzi scheme was un-
covered during the 2009 fiscal year, the SEC reportedly ramped
up enforcement against broker-dealers and investment advis-
ers.324  Looking at the SEC’s reported figures might give one
that impression: in fiscal 2010–14, the SEC brought on average
121 enforcement actions against broker-dealers and 139
against investment advisers, a significant increase over eighty-
nine and seventy-nine per year, respectively, that it brought
between 2000 and 2009.325  But in reality, much of the in-
crease is due to follow-on actions.  Primary enforcement ac-
319 See Velikonja, Politics in Securities Enforcement, supra note 33, at 35 fig.2. R
320 One might contend that trend analysis is useless.  I do not defend analyses
of SEC enforcement trends since they probably are meaningless.  But they are
required by the Results Act, and so they should be done right.
321 See, e.g., H.R. 2142 § 3, 111th Cong. (2010) (proposing changes to report-
ing of agency performance plans); 31 U.S.C. §§ 1121(a)(1), 1122(b)(6) (2012) (re-
quiring the Director of OMB to report “overall trend data” in agency reports).
322 See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, YEAR-BY-YEAR ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS,
https://www.sec.gov/news/newsroom/images/enfstats.pdf [https://perma.cc/
JS5V-9AP2] (suggesting an increase in overall enforcement actions and actions in
specific categories).
323 Compare infra Table 3A, with Table 3B.
324 Bayless & Albarrán, supra note 311. R
325 See infra Table 3A.
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tions against broker-dealers declined between 2010 and 2014,
whereas primary enforcement actions against investment ad-
visers increased more modestly, by 44% and not by 77% as the
SEC’s numbers would imply.326
Similarly, in 2008, the SEC celebrated the most insider
trading cases ever brought, sixty-one.327  But seventeen of the
actions were follow-on actions; sixteen of the seventeen disbar-
ment proceedings were filed because the SEC secured a perma-
nent injunction and monetary penalties against the same
defendants for the same violations in an earlier enforcement
action that was already included in the count.328  Once those
are removed from the tally, the number of enforcement actions
brought in 2008 (forty-four) is lower than in 2002 and 2003
(forty-eight and fifty-three, respectively), while the number of
new defendants sued for insider trading in 2008 is near its
nine-year low.329
Even where the reported direction of the trend is correct,
the magnitude is distorted by follow-on and secondary actions.
In 2008, the SEC brought sixty enforcement actions against
broker-dealers, compared with eighty-nine in 2007.330  The
33% decline was considered significant because large Wall
Street investment banks are usually prosecuted for broker-
dealer violations.331  Excluding follow-on actions, however, the
decline is larger: from 58 to 31 enforcement actions (47% de-
cline) and from 137 to 58 defendants (58% decline).332  Simi-
larly, at the end of fiscal 2011, the SEC celebrated record
numbers of enforcement actions against investment advisers
and broker-dealers.333  The numbers were indeed higher than
326 The result is the same if we look at defendants. See infra Table 3B.
327 See Fiscal 2008 Enforcement Results, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION
(Oct. 22, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-254.htm [https:/
/perma.cc/NJ7Y-JHQ] (“The SEC brought the highest number ever of insider
trading cases in FY 2008.”); infra Table 3A.
328 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA FISCAL 2008,
at 8–9 [hereinafter MARKET DATA FISCAL 2008].  The one exception is a follow-on
case against Laurence McKeever that was brought after McKeever pleaded guilty
to insider trading.  The SEC did not separately sue McKeever for insider trading
other than seeking a full collateral bar. See Seven Defendants Settle SEC Charges
in Wall Street Serial Insider Trading Ring, Litigation Release No. 20,725, 94 SEC
Docket 331 (Sept. 18, 2000), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/
lr20725.htm [https://perma.cc/KMP7-6J7Z].
329 Compare infra Table 3A, with 3B.
330 See Paley & Hilzenrath, supra note 32, at A4 (referencing a study by Mor- R
gan, Lewis & Bockius LLP).
331 See id.
332 Data on file with author.
333 See Mark Schoeff Jr., SEC Sets Record in Crackdown on Advisers, B-D’s,
INVESTMENT NEWS, Nov. 14, 2011, at 4.
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the year before, but enforcement against broker-dealers was
down considerably compared with the period between 2003
and 2009.334
The bias in reported numbers does not always favor the
SEC.  For example, in 2008 the SEC celebrated a 45% increase
in market manipulation enforcement actions using its noisy
figures.335  When follow-on actions are removed, the increase is
actually larger: a 53% increase in enforcement actions target-
ing market manipulation and a 75% increase in the number of
defendants prosecuted.336
Because of these problems, any effort to analyze SEC en-
forcement by comparing the SEC’s reported numbers of en-
forcement actions brought in various categories over time is
largely pointless.  In addition, since financial enforcement
agencies not only adopt different enforcement practices but
also employ different reporting conventions, comparisons
across agencies are meaningless, whether domestically or
internationally.
C. Problems Obscured
The SEC’s reported enforcement statistics produce both
false negatives (i.e., obscure problems) and false positives (i.e.,
identify a non-problem as a problem).
The publication of data assembled using unreliable and
invalid reporting conventions can obscure real underlying
problems.  As noted above, most enforcement against Wall
Street falls in the category of broker-dealer violations.  This
Article reports that primary enforcement actions against bro-
ker-dealers, as well as the number of defendants prosecuted,
have declined since 2009.337  But the SEC’s reported figures
show a different picture, suggesting a considerable increase in
enforcement against broker-dealers.338  Although the SEC has
been criticized for failing to bring large cases,339 it is not obvi-
ous that the agency itself is aware of the decline in primary
enforcement actions for broker-dealer violations.
334 See infra Table 3B.
335 See SEC Announces Fiscal 2008 Enforcement Results, U.S. SEC. & EX-
CHANGE COMISSION (Oct. 22, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-
254.htm [https://perma.cc/W7WF-JYMD]; SEC Probes Reach 671 in Fiscal Year,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, at C5.
336 See infra Table 3B.
337 See id.
338 See infra Table 3A.
339 See Eaglesham, supra note 99. R
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Also, the SEC reports the number of initial investigations
and the number of formal orders of investigation, but does not
report how many formal orders of investigation yield at least
one enforcement action.  Since 2003, the SEC has opened at
least 900 informal investigations per year, except in three
years.340  It issued about 250 formal orders of investigation per
year until 2009; since then, the number has more than
doubled.341  The number of enforcement actions certainly has
not doubled since 2009, even if one included all follow-on and
secondary cases in the count.  The SEC’s figures do not explain
whether the agency is closing more formal investigations with-
out bringing an enforcement action than before 2009, whether
it changed how it counts formal investigations, or whether
something else is going on.
Finally, a review of all follow-on actions suggests that two
modifications may be in order.  Under existing law, a profes-
sional or associational bar is not automatic upon conviction or
the imposition of a permanent injunction for violating anti-
fraud provisions of securities laws.  Rather, the SEC must initi-
ate an enforcement action.342  The process to impose a collat-
eral bar or to suspend an attorney or an accountant from
appearing before the Commission appears to be burdensome
and costly without any countervailing benefit.  Targeted indi-
viduals frequently fight such efforts even though their opposi-
tion is futile.  The SEC wins all follow-on cases, so long as it is
able to locate and serve the defendant.  For example, between
fiscal 2008 and 2014 the SEC initiated follow-on proceedings
against 1,575 individuals and firms.343  About 70% of defend-
ants settled at the time the proceeding was initiated, but 117
(7%) fought the charges.  Only nine of them prevailed—all be-
cause the underlying conviction or permanent injunction was
vacated.344  Perhaps professional and associational bars ought
to be automatic, with a right to reapply for admission or regis-
tration, like most collateral consequences of criminal and civil
enforcement.345
340 See Reports, supra note 129 (containing the Select SEC and Market Data R
reports for years 2003 through 2014).
341 Compare MARKET DATA FISCAL 2008, supra note 328, at 21 (reporting 223 R
formal orders  of investigation), with U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 109, at R
21 (reporting 576 formal orders of investigation).
342 See supra notes 174–177 and accompanying text. R
343 See infra Table 3C.
344 Data on file with author.
345 See, e.g., Urska Velikonja, Waiving Disqualification: When Do Securities
Violators Receive a Reprieve?, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1081, 1088–89 (2015)  (describ-
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Moreover, even if disbarment is not automatic, the SEC
should have the authority to disbar or suspend a defendant in
the primary enforcement action regardless of whether the ac-
tion is filed in court or before the ALJ.  A large majority of
follow-on proceedings are triggered by the imposition of a per-
manent injunction in a civil action that the SEC brought in
district court.346  Under existing laws, the Commission cannot
obtain a professional or associational bar in court; it must
initiate an administrative proceeding.347  But, the Commission
has the power to impose an officer and director bar and a
penny stock bar in both proceedings.348  To avoid wasting re-
sources by having to prosecute multiple enforcement actions,
the SEC ought to be expressly authorized to obtain a profes-
sional or associational bar against a defendant in court when
the primary enforcement action is filed in court.
D. Nonproblems Misidentified as Problems
At least as troublesome as problems obscured by reporting
are alleged “problems” that the SEC’s reporting reveals.  For
example, much has been made of the SEC’s recent shift to-
wards bringing more enforcement actions before administrative
law judges in lieu of filing civil actions in district court.349
Looking at SEC-reported figures during the last fifteen years, it
looks like the SEC used to bring about half of all enforcement
actions in court and half in administrative proceedings.350  Be-
tween 2010 and 2013, after the Dodd-Frank Act authorized the
Commission to file more actions before ALJs, it brought about
two-thirds of enforcement actions before ALJs.  And in 2014, it
brought 81% of enforcement actions before ALJs.  These
ing collateral consequences of securities enforcement that are triggered automati-
cally upon imposition of certain sanctions).
346 See Velikonja, Politics in Securities Enforcement, supra note 33, at 15 (ex- R
plaining that collateral bar proceedings often involve a settled enforcement action
or a loss in court or before an ALJ).
347 A court may exercise “equitable authority” and impose an associational bar
in a judicial proceeding, but it is quite rare. See SEC v. Gupta, No. 1:11-cv-7566-
JSR, 2013 WL 3784138, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2013) (holding that although
courts are not specifically authorized to impose an associational bar, a bar can be
imposed pursuant to court’s equitable authority).
348 Compare, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(f) (2012) (permitting Commission to im-
pose an associational bar for investment advisers after notice and administrative
hearing), with 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (2012) (requiring the Commission bring an ac-
tion in district court to impose an officer and director bar).
349 See, e.g., WilmerHale, supra note 311, at 2 (noting that the SEC increased R
its number of ALJs and ALJ staff in anticipation of bringing more enforcement
actions administratively).
350 Data on file with author.
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figures imply that the SEC is shifting enforcement actions to
in-house administrative law judges, possibly depriving defend-
ants of procedural rights they would enjoy if sued in court.351
Several defendants have raised constitutional objections.352
Jonathan Macey went as far as to suggest that the SEC
chooses arbitrarily and stupidly what defendants to sue before
administrative law judges.353
But these conclusions imply that nothing else has changed
in SEC enforcement, during a time when much has changed.
Of 755 enforcement actions brought in fiscal 2014, 145 were
filed in district court and 610 in administrative court.354  Of
those 610, a record 254 were follow-on actions, which are al-
ways filed in the administrative forum, and another 112 were
delinquent filing cases, also always filed in the administrative
forum.  If these cases are excluded, the SEC brought between
60% and 74% of primary enforcement actions in court between
2000 and 2013.355  The shift to the administrative forum oc-
curred in fiscal 2014, when the SEC brought 37% of enforce-
ment actions in court and 63% before ALJs.356
In addition, some subject-matter categories saw larger
shifts towards administrative enforcement than others.  The
two subject-matter categories with the largest shifts in filings
away from district courts are Market Manipulation and Issuer
Reporting and Disclosure cases.  In 2012, the SEC sued 117 of
129 (91%) securities violators in primary enforcement actions
categorized as Market Manipulation in district court; in 2014,
it sued only 56 of 92 (61%) securities violators in primary en-
forcement actions filed in court.357  The 30% decline seems to
imply that many more equally-situated defendants must de-
fend themselves before administrative law judges in 2014 than
351 See, e.g., Michael Dvorak, Note, SEC Administrative Proceedings and Equal
Protection “Class of One” Challenges: Evaluating Concerns About SEC Forum
Choices, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1195, 1197 (2015) (suggesting that SEC forum
selection may violate equal protection).
352 See, e.g., Jean Eaglesham, SEC Is Steering More Trials to Judges it Ap-
points, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-is-steering-
more-trials-to-judges-it-appoints-1413849590 [https://perma.cc/P526-VNE2]
(quoting at least one defendant who “alleged the SEC is violating his constitu-
tional rights to due process and equal protection under the law”).
353 Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Why Challenges to SEC Admin Court Will Likely
Keep Failing, LAW360.COM (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/
628601/why-challenges-to-sec-admin-court-will-likely-keep-failing [http://
perma.cc/WLP7-KFW2] (quoting Yale Law Professor Jonathan Macey).
354 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 109, at 3. R
355 Data on file with author.
356 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 109, at 3. R
357 Data on file with author.
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did in 2012.  But the SEC also changed enforcement priorities
between 2012 and 2014.  It began vigorously prosecuting com-
pliance with Rule 105 of Regulation M358 in lieu of going after
penny stock fraudsters.359  The former actions have nearly al-
ways been brought before administrative law judges while the
latter are always filed in court.  If Rule 105 actions are removed
from the count, the SEC’s forum choices for market manipula-
tion have changed in favor of filing more actions in district
court, not the opposite: 117 of 127 (92%) primary securities
violators (excluding those charged with violations of Rule 105
of Regulation M)360 were sued in district court in 2012, and 56
of 56 (100%) such defendants were sued in district court in
2014.361  As a result, the SEC’s forum choices in market ma-
nipulation cases seem perfectly consistent over time—but the
types of enforcement actions the Commission brings for market
manipulation have, in fact, changed considerably.
Similarly, in 2013, the SEC reported that it sued 56 of
132362 (42%) defendants for Issuer Reporting and Disclosure
violations in administrative forum; in fiscal 2014, it sued 117 of
145 (81%) in administrative forum.363  However, many of these
were follow-on actions and in 2014, the SEC listed twenty-
seven stop orders as Issuer Reporting actions.364  If correctly
coded, these should be included in the Securities Offering cate-
gory.365  Once these actions are removed, the SEC sued 76 of
117 (65%) primary securities defendants in Issuer Reporting
actions in administrative forum in 2013; and 73 out of 100
358 Rule 105 of Regulation M prohibits underwriters in public offerings of
equity securities from shorting such securities during a restricted period before
the public offering. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.105 (2015).
359 In FY 2013, the SEC initiated twenty-three enforcement actions for Rule
105 violations. U.S. SEC & EXCH. COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2013 AGENCY FINANCIAL
REPORT 137 (2013).  In FY 2014, it initiated thirty.  By contrast, in FY 2012, it
initiated two such enforcement actions.
360 See Touradji Capital Management L.P., Exchange Act Release No. 65,923,
102 SEC Docket 2193 (Dec. 9, 2011); Wesley Capital Management LLC, Exchange
Act Release No. 67,510, 104 SEC Docket 1054 (July 26, 2012).
361 The number is very similar in FY 2015, when the SEC reported suing 140
of 159 defendants (88%) in court.  Once the figure is adjusted for relief defendants
and follow-on actions, the SEC sued 134 of 150 defendants in court (90%)—a
figure very similar to that before the shift to administrative adjudication.
362 Select SEC and Market Data Report 2013 lists 138 defendants. U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 146, at 3 tbl.2.  Of those, two are relief defendants, R
three are in 12(j) actions that should have been categorized as Delinquent Filing,
and one is a stop order. Id.
363 Data on file with author.
364 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 109, at 13–15. R
365 See supra Part III.A.2.
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(73%) primary securities defendants in 2014.366  In both years,
nearly three-quarters of such actions were settled.  The en-
forcement staff brought several settled actions before ALJs to
avoid litigating the same issue twice, now that the SEC can
obtain monetary penalties against unregistered individuals,
such as CEOs and CFOs, in administrative proceedings.367
There has been a shift in enforcement of accounting fraud to
the administrative forum, but smaller than SEC-reported
figures would imply.
E. The Denominator Problem
The variables used to measure SEC enforcement activity,
most notably the number of enforcement actions and the num-
ber of defendants, are used as the denominator to evaluate and
report on other aspects of the SEC’s performance, such as its
success rate.368  As a result, measurement problems bleed into
other important parts of the entire performance report.
The SEC reports its success in an annual report:369 it is
measured by the percentage of defendants in enforcement ac-
tions against which the SEC prevails on at least one of the
counts.370  The fact that follow-on cases are lumped together
with primary enforcement actions biases the success rate
upwards.  The Commission wins all follow-on cases, including
contested cases, except for a handful of actions where it cannot
locate the defendant or where the defendant’s conviction is
vacated.371  The Commission does not win all primary enforce-
366 The result is very similar in fiscal year 2015.  The SEC reported that it sued
52 defendants in court and 161 in administrative forum (76%).  Data on file with
author.  Once relief defendants and defendants in follow-on actions and stop
orders are removed, the Division of Enforcement sued 46 defendants in court and
113 in administrative forums (71%). Id.
367 As a result, the SEC brought fewer secondary enforcement actions in 2014.
See supra notes 206–254 and accompanying text. R
368 The denominator problem is very common in agency performance report-
ing.  For example, in its 2006 Performance and Accountability Report the SEC
reported collection rates.  But both the numerator and the denominator were
incorrect, and this yielded a collection rate that exceeded the actual rate by a
considerable percentage (for example in 2003, the actual collection rate was 7%,
not 40%). Compare U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2006 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTA-
BILITY REPORT 54 exhibit 2.20 (2006), with U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2005 PER-
FORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 47 exhibit 2.20 (2005).
369 See, e.g., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FY 2010 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT 27 (2010) (reporting number of enforcement actions successfully resolved
in FY 2010).
370 See id.
371 See, e.g., Gary K. Juncker, Administrative Proceedings Rulings Release No.
673, 101 SEC Docket 545 (ALJ May 19, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/alj/al-
jorders/2011/ap673bpm.pdf [https://perma.cc/36JF-52S9] (Commission una-
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-4\CRN401.txt unknown Seq: 68  4-MAY-16 11:55
968 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:901
ment actions, but lumping all actions together biases the suc-
cess rate upwards.
According to the 2010 annual report the agency prevailed
against 92% of defendants in enforcement actions resolved
during the fiscal year.372  My analysis of all enforcement ac-
tions filed in FY 2010, a somewhat different sample, neverthe-
less shows a similar figure.  Overall, the SEC prevailed against
95% of defendants,373 while defendants prevailed in fewer than
1% of enforcement actions.  Enforcement actions against the
remaining defendants are either still ongoing, or were dis-
missed voluntarily because the entity ceased to exist or the
defendant passed away, because the entity defendant agreed to
wind down operations, or because the owner-manager defen-
dant paid the disgorgement, so the case against the defunct
entity became moot.  But success rate thus measured over-
states the SEC’s success in primary enforcement actions be-
cause it includes follow-on cases.  In follow-on cases filed in
2010, the SEC prevailed in all but 6 actions in which it was
unable to serve process on the defendant, for a 98% success
rate.374  In primary enforcement actions, the SEC prevailed
against 94% of defendants and lost against 1%.375
F. Changed Enforcement Incentives
With little information about what drives the SEC’s en-
forcement choices, legal academics have speculated about the
SEC’s incentives.  Adam Pritchard suggested that the SEC’s
prosecutions are politically motivated.376  By contrast, Joseph
Grundfest and Amanda Rose have proposed that the SEC, as
an expert agency, considers the public interest while avoiding
bringing enforcement actions that it does not believe it can
win.377  While this study cannot shed light on how the SEC
ble to locate respondent); Todd Newman, Investment Advisors Act Release No.
4084, 2015 WL 2328705 (May 15, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/opin-
ions/2015/ia-4084.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DVE-5NZW] (reversing associational
bar because defendant’s conviction was reversed).
372 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 369, at 27. R
373 Excluding relief defendants, delinquent filing, and contempt proceedings.
374 Data on file with author.
375 Data on file with author.
376 See A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Ac-
tions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 1018
(1999).
377 See Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the
Federal Securities Laws: The Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961, 970
(1994); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the
Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 1301, 1306 (2008).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-4\CRN401.txt unknown Seq: 69  4-MAY-16 11:55
2016] REPORTING AGENCY PERFORMANCE 969
selects whom to prosecute,378 it suggests that the dominant
statistics on enforcement that it reports to Congress likely in-
fluence what types of actions it brings.
The SEC takes great pride in its enforcement program and
likes to report that it is continuously improving.379  Contested
cases consume greater resources, so the agency has an incen-
tive to bring cases that are more easily brought: delinquent
filing actions where targeted firms put up no resistance, strict-
liability offenses, and actions that do not allege violations of the
antifraud provisions of securities laws.380  The increase in en-
forcement actions targeting delinquent filing, a strict-liability
offense, may be driven as much by the concern about fraud as
it is by statistics.  Similarly, the SEC filed thirty-six enforce-
ment actions in September 2014 for failure to report insiders’
transactions in the company’s stock under Section 16(a) of the
Exchange Act, a strict-liability offense.381  These enforcement
actions served as a reminder to market participants that the
Commission is serious about policing even the smallest infrac-
tions.382  They also had the fortunate side effect of boosting the
SEC’s enforcement statistics.  In 2013 and 2014 the SEC
brought several dozen enforcement actions for violation of Rule
105 of Regulation M, another strict-liability offense;383 most
were filed in September, the last month of the fiscal year.  Until
2013, the SEC brought one or two such actions per year.  In
addition to reminding market participants that the SEC is al-
378 Two studies released recently suggest that the SEC is sensitive to pressure
from Congress and influential congressmen in selecting enforcement targets. See
Maria M. Correia, Political Connections and SEC Enforcement, 57 J. ACCT. & ECON.
241, 255 (2014) (finding that firms that contribute to congressmen who sit on
oversight committees are only about half as likely to be subject to SEC enforce-
ment as those that do not); Jonas Heese, Government Preferences and SEC En-
forcement 15–17 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 15-054, 2015), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2542242 [https://perma.cc/
RK2T-3L3P] (finding reports that the SEC is less likely to prosecute large employ-
ers, in particular during presidential election years if they are headquartered in
politically important states).
379 See Marc J. Fagel, What The SEC Enforcement Stats Really Tell Us,
LAW360.COM (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/627323/what-the-
sec-enforcement-stats-really-tell-us?article_related_content=1 [http://perma.cc/
BZP9-E4AG].
380 See generally Posner, supra note 28, at 311–12 (concluding that a rational R
administrative agency has an incentive to focus on smaller cases).
381 See Velikonja, Politics in Securities Enforcement, supra note 33, at 13. R
382 Policing “broken windows” has been one of SEC Chair Mary Jo White’s
enforcement priorities since she was appointed in 2013. See Mary Jo White,
Chair, Remarks at the Securities Enforcement Forum (Oct. 9, 2013), http://
www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539872100 [http://perma.cc/
3NA7-LDER].
383 See Velikonja, Politics in Securities Enforcement, supra note 33, at 13. R
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ways watching, these cases boosted the SEC’s enforcement
tally.
By using the wrong statistics to measure its performance—
focusing on the number of actions, as opposed to frauds pre-
vented, sanctions secured, or some other measure of quality—
the Commission communicates to its staff the wrong things
about what matters and what should not.384  Because they are
rewarded for the number of enforcement actions brought, the
SEC staff rationally focus on cases that can be investigated and
prosecuted quickly,385 regardless of whether doing so increases
compliance with securities laws and protects investors.386
V
TOWARD MORE MEANINGFUL REPORTING
Quality reporting can help identify areas that need im-
provement, as well as indicate what things work well.  Report-
ing thus helps direct resources to where they are needed.
However, bad reporting produces none of the benefits, but at
significant cost, including the direct cost of preparing reports
and the opportunity cost engendered by shifts in priorities of
the agency and its staff, wasted opportunities to improve, and
undermined oversight.
The metrics used to measure the SEC’s enforcement per-
formance are invalid and unreliable for the purposes for which
they are being used.  Because the data collection is still in
progress, this Part cannot and does not develop better mea-
sures.  Rather, it elaborates on why the SEC has continued to
use flawed statistics to suggest improvements in performance
and increased deterrence, and suggests possible ways to im-
prove their quality.  Like many other agencies, the SEC is
under enormous pressure to report increasing enforcement
figures despite a modest budget appropriation.  Moreover, a
generally hostile Congress, relying on the Results Act, has
threatened to punish agencies that fail to meet performance
targets with budget cuts, even where targets are missed be-
384 Katz, supra note 23, at 506. R
385 Id. (“Because people strive to achieve the results that are measured, the
choice of measures strongly determines what people try to do. When an agency
uses faulty measures to evaluate its staff, it rewards the wrong people for the
wrong actions.”).
386 See J. Robert Brown, Reforming the SEC: The Unnecessary Emphasis on
Stats, THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (Oct. 5, 2009, 5:00 AM), http://www.theraceto
thebottom.org/the-sec-governance/reforming-the-sec-the-unnecessary-empha
sis-on-stats.html [http://perma.cc/TK8F-D7E6].
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cause of meager appropriations.387  The SEC has responded
rationally by reporting statistics that are nearly useless.  There
are two possible approaches to improving reporting.  First, re-
duce incentives for biased reporting, and second, remove re-
porting discretion from the agencies’ hands.  This Part
discusses both in turn.  Finally, this Part proposes that agen-
cies share more liberally their raw enforcement data to en-
courage external research.
A. Reducing Incentives for Biased Reporting
Misconduct rates are cyclical and noisy.  In the aftermath
of a crisis, wrongdoers are easier to identify than earlier, when
capital is plentiful and investors are paying less attention.388
As a result, enforcement rates usually move in step with mis-
conduct rates (with a lag of a year or two), unless enforcement
budgets receive a significant and sustained increase.  Trying to
avoid cuts, agencies might pursue nickel-and-dime cases at
the expense of more significant prosecutions in order to report
high-enforcement figures.
To reduce shifts in enforcement and biased reporting,
agencies should not be punished with budget cuts for bringing
fewer enforcement actions or reporting a lower success rate
than they forecast.  In addition, it appears plausible that less
congressional oversight would yield better results, while more
congressional oversight over enforcement would be counter-
productive.389  And so, rather than tracking enforcement an-
nually, multiple-year budgeting or partial budgetary
independence, and greater discretion might allow agencies to
deploy resources more effectively, including to save in low-mis-
conduct years and shift to later years, and vice versa.  Multiple-
year budgeting would reduce the frequency of congressional
meddling and would enable the SEC to plan several years in
advance.  Partial budgetary independence, likewise, would re-
duce congressional influence and limit the “binge-purge ap-
387 Certainly, many in Congress must be aware that SEC enforcement statis-
tics are fuzzy, and are not fooled by the SEC’s numbers.  The better interpretation
of the game played is that the congressional oversight committees want the SEC
to show good numbers because no one wants to be seen as in favor of fraud, while
at the same time limiting the SEC’s budget. See Velikonja, Politics in Securities
Enforcement, supra note 33, at 4–5. R
388 See Amitai Aviram, Allocating Regulatory Resources, 37 J. CORP. L. 739,
745 (2012) (stating that during economic booms the public will likely underesti-
mate the threat of fraud); Wang & Winton, supra note 98, at 25 (discussing fraud R
risk at the end of investment booms).
389 For a more detailed discussion as applied to SEC enforcement, see Ve-
likonja, Politics in Securities Enforcement, supra note 33, at 20–21. R
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proach” to the SEC’s budget.390  Annual changes in SEC
output are mostly noise, yet they command an inordinate
amount of attention and hand wringing.  Constant pressure on
SEC leadership and, in turn, staff lowers morale and leads to
short-term focus.  Longer-term financial security would enable
the SEC Chair to shift resources from year to year, and to
pursue goals that will not necessarily produce results in the
same fiscal year.
In fact, Section 991 of the Dodd-Frank Act includes a
longer-term budget planning for the SEC.391  It authorizes an-
nual budgets of $1.3 billion in 2011 increasing to $2.25 billion
in 2015.392  Unfortunately, Dodd-Frank’s mandate has not
been honored.393  Actual appropriations have lagged those en-
acted in the Dodd-Frank Act: in 2012, the actual budget was
approximately $180 million less (12%) than commanded by the
Dodd-Frank Act; in 2013 it was $500 million less (29%); in
2014 it was $650 million less (33%); and in 2015 it was $750
million less (33%).394
B. Standardizing Agency Reporting
Agencies possess considerable discretion in developing
performance indicators on which they are assessed.395  As a
result, some agencies include a lot of information in annual
reports, while others include very little.  Agencies also report
very different performance indicators, and use different meth-
ods to calculate performance indicators that nominally mea-
sure the same thing.  As a result, comparisons among agencies
are difficult or impossible.
Changing incentives may improve reporting somewhat, but
will likely be insufficient when favored performance metrics are
as “built into the soul” of an agency as they are at the SEC.396
390 See Joel Seligman, Key Implications of the Dodd-Frank Act for Independent
Regulatory Agencies, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 22 (2011).
391 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
111–302, § 991, 124 Stat. 1376, 1950 (2010).
392 Id. § 991(c).
393 It is not uncommon for one statute to increase an agency’s workload and
budget appropriation, and for the budget committees to approve lower budget
figures.
394 See Frequently Requested FOIA Document—BA vs. Actual Obligations ($ in
000s), U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Mar. 2, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/
foia/docs/budgetact.htm [https://perma.cc/V2J7-NDDC] (showing budget au-
thority of $1.321 billion in 2012 and 2013, $1.35 billion in 2014, and $1.5 billion
in 2015).
395 See supra Part I.
396 J. Robert Brown Jr., The SEC, Enforcement, and the Problem of Stats,
THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (June 6, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.theracetothebot
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Like financial reporting, performance indicators regarding im-
portant non-financial items should be removed from agency
discretion and, to the extent possible, standardized across
agencies, at least those with similar powers and functions.
Many of the agencies’ annual performance reports feature simi-
lar indicators, such as the number of investigations, enforce-
ment actions, sanctions, success rates, collection rates, and
the like.  Ensuring that such indicators are measured consist-
ently would shed some light on enforcement overall.  In addi-
tion, like it did for agency financial reporting, OMB could
develop indicators to measure both the quantity and the qual-
ity of enforcement more accurately.397
Standardized reporting of nonfinancial indicators would
likely improve the accuracy and the quality of reports, and
would allow for comparisons among enforcement agencies.  It
would be useful to know whether enforcement rates and actual
sanctions vary across agency jurisdictions.  To some extent,
agencies already report comparable figures.  For example, the
largest SEC monetary penalty imposed is $800 million against
AIG for accounting fraud.398  The largest monetary penalty that
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ever im-
posed against recidivist BP Products North America Inc. for
hundreds of serious and willful violations was $81.34 mil-
lion.399  General Motors paid $35 million to the U.S. Depart-
ment of Transportation, “the highest civil penalty amount ever
paid as a result of a National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis-
tration investigation,”400 after it failed to do anything for ten
years about an ignition switch defect that killed at least thir-
teen people and led to a massive recall.401
Whether these penalties are effective or not has not been
seriously explored, in part because information is unavailable,
and in part because we know so little about what works and
tom.org/the-sec-governance/the-sec-enforcement-and-the-problem-of-
stats.html [https://perma.cc/AJZ9-HSFC] (quoting an SEC enforcement attorney
saying that the metric of counting enforcement actions to report on enforcement
performance “is built into the soul of the [Enforcement] Division”).
397 See discussion supra note 68. R
398 See BAEZ, OVERDAHL & BUCKBERG, supra note 271, at 18. R
399 The second largest ever OSHA fine was imposed against BP Products North
America Inc. four years earlier, for similar violations. See Occupational Safety &
Health Admin., Top Enforcement Cases Based on Total Issued Penalty, U.S. DEP’T
LABOR, https://www.osha.gov/dep/enforcement/top_cases.html [https://
perma.cc/4CYE-TCY8].
400 Alex Rogers, GM to Pay Record $35 Million Fine Over Ignition Switch Recalls,
TIME (May 16, 2014), http://time.com/102906/gm-fine-ignition-recalls/ [https:/
/perma.cc/2HCS-CAAH].
401 Id.
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what does not in enforcement.  Standardized reporting would
likely reveal persistent and large discrepancies between en-
forcement and sanctioning authority of various agencies (and
within agencies), and set the stage to begin a conversation on
overall enforcement priorities.  Moreover, it could help agencies
learn about what works in enforcement and what does not.
C. Public Access to Information
However, if standardizing enforcement reporting across
agencies is too large of a project, or turns out to not be useful,
agencies should outsource: make available their enforcement
raw data to researchers for analysis.  In fact, banking regula-
tors which do not face the annual appropriations process in
Congress that the SEC, the CFTC, and many other agencies
face, already share their enforcement data liberally.  The Fed-
eral Reserve,402 the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency,403 and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation404 all
make their enforcement data available, searchable, and easy to
download.
There is currently no publicly-available database of SEC
enforcement actions.  The Wall Street Journal collects the data
and publishes the occasional article based on the information
in its database, but according to the Journal, the database is
proprietary.405  NERA Economic Consulting, a private con-
sultancy, used to publish a biannual SEC enforcement re-
port.406  It also used to share its enforcement action database
with academics in return for credit.  It discontinued the prac-
tice in early 2013.  NYU recently joined hands with Cornerstone
to make available a database of securities enforcement, but
they only include actions against public companies.  As a re-
sult, any academic analysis of securities enforcement would
require an investment of considerable resources and time to
402 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Search Enforcement
Actions, FED. RESERVE (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/en
forcementactions/search.aspx [https://perma.cc/D84G-E8VH].
403 Enforcement Actions Search Tool, OFF. COMPTROLLER CURRENCY, http://
apps.occ.gov/EnforcementActions/ [https://perma.cc/Q2D6-PH4F] .
404 FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders, FED. DEPOSIT INS. Corp. (Jan. 21,
2016), https://www5.fdic.gov/EDO/DataPresentation.html [https://perma.cc/
95WJ-63E3].
405 Author’s request for data was denied.
406 See, e.g., MAX GULKER, ELAINE BUCKBERG & JAMES OVERDAHL, NAT’L ECON.
RESEARCH ASSOCS., SEC SETTLEMENT TRENDS: 2H11 UPDATE 2 (2012) (collecting SEC
settlement data for FY 2011); BAEZ, OVERDAHL & BUCKBERG, supra note 271, at 2 R
(same for 2012).
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collect the needed data.  Not surprisingly, such studies remain
limited to small subsets of SEC enforcement activity.
Sharing enforcement data would not impose a significant
cost on the SEC.  The SEC ordinarily publishes a litigation or
administrative release at the time that it files an enforcement
action and often releases updates as the action proceeds.  But
press releases are incomplete because they are not published
consistently, they do not include complete relief obtained, and
are almost never published when the SEC loses.  SEC annual
reports and inspector general reports suggest that the Com-
mission maintains a database of open and closed enforcement
actions called “The Hub.”407  Releasing such information in a
format that can be analyzed without a considerable investment
of time and effort would attract academic research.
External research should be attractive to the Commission
because it does not currently have the resources in-house to
analyze much of the information it produces,408 yet accurate
research and analysis would be very useful.409  Data access
would enable researchers to address serious concerns about
SEC enforcement quickly and effectively.  For example, the
SEC routinely faces criticism that it punishes firms at the ex-
pense of going after individual defendants.410  Yet there is a
considerable amount of evidence to the contrary,411 but the
SEC has not analyzed the data in its possession to deflect such
criticisms.  Also, there is widespread belief that defendants the
407 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SURVEY OF ENFORCE-
MENT’S HUB SYSTEM (2008), http://www.sec.gov/oig/reportspubs/449final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PF2N-VH63].
408 See Michael S. Piwowar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at
the University of Notre Dame, Mendoza College of Business, Center for the Study
of Financial Regulation (Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/re
marks-at-university-of-notre-dame.html [http://perma.cc/P99K-LMNX] (encour-
aging academics to use the SEC’s Market Information Data Analytics System in
their research).
409 The SEC appears quite eager to attract external research, just not by
sharing any data. See William D. Cohan, SEC Raises Barrier to Disclosure of
Information, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 4, 2014, 11:47 AM), http://dealbook.ny
times.com//2014/11/04/s-e-c-raises-barrier-to-disclosure-of-information/
[http://perma.cc/97NN-47D5].
410 Macey, supra note 8, at 651. R
411 See Michael Klausner & Jason Hegland, SEC Practice in Targeting and
Penalizing Individual Defendants, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN.
REG. (Sept. 3, 2013), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/09/03/sec-practice-
in-targeting-and-penalizing-individual-defendants/ [https://perma.cc/VAF7-
G9LS]; see also Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence
from the SEC’s Fair Fund Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 331, 376, 382 tbl.6 (2015)
(showing that individuals pay fines more often than firms in cases that give rise to
a fair fund distribution).
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SEC sues in court are much more likely to prevail than those it
sues before the administrative law judges.412  The source of the
information purported to compare outcomes in contested ac-
tions filed in district court and before the ALJs.  Yet it com-
pared trial verdicts with initial decisions by ALJs,413 and
omitted dozens of contested court cases that are decided by
summary judgment or dismissed each year.  After those are
added, defendants’ odds of prevailing against the SEC are the
same in court and before an ALJ.414  Although the SEC pos-
sesses all the information it needs to correct the misapprehen-
sion,415 it apparently lacks the resources to analyze the
information in its hands. Instead, the SEC has responded with
vague statements that the administrative process is “very
fair,”416 which are considerably less effective at deflecting criti-
cism and, more importantly, congressional action.
The SEC appears quite thin-skinned about criticism, yet it
is likely that much of academic research would help the agency
further its enforcement objectives.417  Finally, disclosure would
add credibility to SEC reporting and, indirectly, to its enforce-
ment program.
CONCLUSION
Enforcement agencies are often criticized for their failures.
These critiques routinely revolve around mishandling particu-
lar cases.  That approach is not wrong because individual fail-
ures often reflect systemic failures.  But it is incomplete and
could lead to changes in policy that are not warranted.  A better
assessment would be based on overall enforcement perform-
ance.  In order to be useful, that performance should be re-
ported in a manner that is reliable, meaningful, standardized,
and comparable from year to year.
412 This belief finds support in a newspaper article published in the Wall Street
Journal.  Eaglesham, supra note 352 (reporting that the SEC won 100% contested R
administrative cases and 61% of contested court cases between September 2013
and September 2014).
413 See id.
414 The research is complete for fiscal years 2007 to 2015; see also Zaring,
supra note 29.  A note of caution: cases filed in court and before ALJs are very R
different, so it is certainly plausible that similarly situated defendants fare differ-
ently in different venues.
415 See SEC, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 70, at 39 (listing a source for R
SEC success rates).
416 Eaglesham, supra note 352 (quoting SEC Chair Mary Jo White). R
417 See, e.g., Velikonja, supra note 411, at 295 (commending the SEC’s fair R
fund program).
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This Article pulls back the curtain on the SEC’s reporting
of its enforcement activities.  By carefully reviewing fifteen
years of data, the Article shows that many of the SEC statistics
developed to measure enforcement are deeply flawed.  The way
that the SEC counts enforcement actions filed and aggregate
monetary penalties ordered consistently overstates the SEC’s
enforcement output, masks trends, obscures real problems in
enforcement, and reveals non-existent “problems” that the SEC
then tries to resolve.  Furthermore, flawed statistics bleed into
other aspects of SEC reporting when the Commission uses one
statistic as a denominator to generate a new performance indi-
cator.  Finally, not only do the used statistics fail to represent
the SEC’s true enforcement output, they also have the poten-
tial to distort its enforcement choices in favor of easier-to-pros-
ecute strict-liability violations that are more likely to yield
reportable “results.”
As a pilot study, this Article merely reveals reporting
problems and proposes possible reasons as to why the
problems persist.  Once more data is collected, we can begin to
develop statistics that could better measure the qualities of
interest.
APPENDIX
















2000 503 388 352 344 
2001 485 359 328 314 
2002 598 450 403 393 
2003 679 447 405 394 
2004 638 423 402 381 
2005 630 453 430 370 
2006 574 421 400 309 
2007 655 485 473 420 
2008 671 492 482 371 
2009 664 510 495 403 
2010 681 449 431 325 
2011 735 496 482 361 
2012 734 503 494 367 
2013 676 469 469 337 
2014 755 507 507 400 
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TABLE 3A: SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AS REPORTED
(2000–2014)
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Issuer Reporting 
and Disclosure 
103 112 163 199 179 184 138 219 
Securities Offering  125 95 120 109 98 60 61 68 
Broker Dealer & 
Municipal 
Securities 
72 65 73 137 141 98 83 94 
Investment 
Adviser 
46 46 57 77 94 106 102 83 
Delinquent Filing 8 14 10 11 21 60 91 53 
Insider Trading 40 57 59 50 42 50 46 47 
Market 
Manipulation 
48 40 42 32 39 46 27 36 
Contempt 36 41 47 42 21 23 21 12 
Other 25 25 23 22 4 2 5 44 
Total 503 485 598 679 639 629 574 656 
 




157 143 126 89 79 68 99 2058 
Broker Dealer & 
Municipal 
Securities 
62 111 76 121 151 130 172 1590 
Securities Offering  121 141 144 123 89 103 81 1538 
Investment 
Adviser 
90 84 113 151 155 140 137 1481 
Delinquent Filing 111 92 106 121 127 132 107 1064 
Insider Trading 61 37 53 57 58 44 52 753 
Market 
Manipulation 
52 39 34 35 46 49 63 628 
Contempt 10 15 18 14 9 n/a* n/a* 299 
Other 7 2 11 4 5 5 37 221 
FCPA n/a n/a n/a 20 15 5 7 47 
Total 671 664 681 735 734 676 755 9679 
Source: U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, Select SEC and Market Data FY
2000–2014.
* In 2013, the SEC stopped including contempt proceedings (i.e., actions to enforce
payment of previously imposed monetary penalties or compliance with a prior enforce-
ment action). As a result, enforcement tallies after FY 2013 are depressed compared
with prior years.
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TABLE 3B: SEC ADJUSTED ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS (I.E., NOT INCL.
FOLLOW-ON AND SECONDARY CASES) (2000–2014)
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Issuer Reporting 
and Disclosure 
71 84 136 149 135 137 101 155 
Securities Offering  94 61 87 76 74 41 47 45 
Broker Dealer & 
Municipal 
Securities 
51 43 35 54 60 51 34 58 
Investment 
Adviser 
35 29 34 43 56 65 63 51 
Delinquent Filing 8 14 10 11 21 60 91 53 
Insider Trading 36 48 53 39 32 42 38 38 
Market 
Manipulation 
32 24 29 17 21 33 22 30 
Contempt 36 41 47 42 21 23 21 12 
Other 25 21 19 15 1 2 3 43 
Total 388 355 450 446 421 454 420 485 
 




111 96 84 58 48 50 81 1496 
Broker Dealer & 
Municipal 
Securities 
31 72 29 38 42 31 37 666 
Securities Offering  76 112 75 89 81 90 66 1114 
Investment 
Adviser 
56 54 59 72 83 65 68 833 
Delinquent Filing 111 92 106 121 127 132 107 1064 
Insider Trading 44 31 37 49 52 44 52 635 
Market 
Manipulation 
46 36 29 32 42 48 48 489 
Contempt 10 15 18 14 9 n/a* n/a* 299 
Other 7 2 8 3 3 4 3 193 
FCPA n/a n/a n/a 20 15 5 7 47 
Total 492 510 445 496 502 469 503 6836 
* In 2013, the SEC stopped including contempt proceedings (i.e., actions to enforce
payment of previously imposed monetary penalties or compliance with a prior enforce-
ment action). As a result, enforcement tallies after FY 2013 are depressed compared
with prior years.
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TABLE 3C: FOLLOW-ON AND SECONDARY ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
(2000–2014)
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Issuer Reporting 
and Disclosure 
32 28 27 50 44 48 36 64 
Securities Offering  31 34 33 33 24 19 14 23 
Broker Dealer & 
Municipal 
Securities 
21 21 42 82 79 47 49 36 
Investment 
Adviser & Transfer 
Agent 
11 14 23 34 37 41 39 32 
Delinquent Filing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Insider Trading 4 9 6 11 10 8 8 9 
Market 
Manipulation 
16 16 13 15 18 14 5 6 
Contempt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 0 4 4 7 3 0 2 0 
Total 115 126 148 232 215 177 153 170 
 




45 47 40 31 31 18 18 559 
Securities Offering  45 29 69 34 8 13 15 424 
Broker Dealer & 
Municipal 
Securities 
31 39 46 83 109 99 132 916 
Investment 
Adviser 
35 30 53 79 71 75 68 642 
Delinquent Filing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Insider Trading 17 6 16 8 6 0 0 118 
Market 
Manipulation 
6 3 7 3 4 1 15 142 
Contempt 0 0 0 0 0 n/a n/a 0 
Other 0 0 2 1 2 1 0 26 
FCPA n/a n/a n/a 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 179 154 233 239 231 207 248 2827 
